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This paper is an attempt to explain the puzzling rural stability despite 
drastic rural development in the colonial period in Hong Kong, bi the first part of 
the thesis, previous research on the problem is reviewed critically. Then insights 
are drawn from the current literature on social movements and peasant resistance 
in order to formulate an alternative framework in explaining the phenomenon. 
From a comparative case analysis based on the six cases of rural social 
conflicts, I locate two crucial factors of the emergence or non-emergence of rural 
protests. The first is the absence or presence of suppression by the rural elite. The 
second is the absence or presence of autonomous organization in the villages. The 
non-occurrence of manifested rural protests was a combined effect of the absence 
of autonomous organizations and presence of elite suppression. Highly 
confrontational collective action with high participation rate would appear when 
the elite suspended their suppression of mobilization and relevant autonomous 
organizations existed. When only one of the two conditions of non-emergence of 
rural protest was fulfilled, intermediate forms of collective action would arise: 
either confrontational action with low participation rate or non-confrontational 
action with high participation rate. 
Viewed in this light, to explain the ‘rural stability' in Hong Kong entails 
the investigation of why the rural elite were always suppressive to grassroots 
mobilization and why there were little autonomous organizations in the village. 
These can only be understood in terms of the specific historical trajectory of 
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colonial state building in rural Hong Kong and development of various rural 
organizations. 
What this study implies is that the "rural stability" in Hong Kong - or we 
can extend the conclusion to the case of urban stability as well - is a historically 
and contextually specific phenomenon. Whether such stability will continue into 
the future is not guaranteed. At last, but not least, the reified image of a "stable" 
New Territories in particular and Hong Kong in general has to be abandoned. 
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Chapter 1 The Paradox of Rural Stability 
Introduction 
In 1899，when the British landed on the "New Territories" resided by the 
Great Clans and the Hakka villagers, they were seen by the latter as barbarians to 
be driven away from their native land. An armed uprising was organized against 
the occupying troops. However, 68 years later in 1967，the colonial government 
seemed to have become a legitimate government over the rural elite. The rural 
leaders allied with the authority and was active in persuading their constituents to 
cooperate with the British to suppress the rebellious leftists. Over the 1970s, the 
wheel of urbanization rolled over all comers of the New Territories. Agrarian 
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communities were uprooted one after the other. But surprisingly, this never gave 
rise to large scale rural unrest challenging the colonial authority. 
- T h e tranquillity of the grassroots villagers under the stress of rapid rural 
development is as puzzling as the remarkable stability in the urban areas over the 
period of colonial rule from a comparative perspective. In the postwar 
development literature, the conservative modernization literature argues that rapid 
development creates instability in society which ultimately leads to conflicts and 
protests. The rural society has been viewed as a traditional force which often 
resists the coming of modem values and social institutions. The radical 
dependency literature also predicts a high level of rural unrest in a developing 
society, but for different reasons. The imposition of political subjugation in the 
form of imperialism and colonialism is often sufficient cause for rebellion. Rapid 
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development is always accompanied with social upheaval in most Third World 
countries. Why did this not happen in Hong Kong? 
In fact, many students of Hong Kong society have tried explaining this 
stability - despite - rapid growth paradox. However, as we will see, their approach 
is quite problematic and a revision of explanation is required. My thesis is such an 
attempt in finding an alternative explanation. Local literature on social stability of 
Hong Kong as well as foreign literature on peasant protest and social movement 
will be reviewed before the substantial analysis of the issue. 
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Current Literature on Social Stability in Hong Kong 
The "paradox of stability" (relative social and political stability in spite of 
rapid development) attracts the attention of the first generation sociologists of 
Hong Kong. There is already a sizable literature addressing the problem (e.g. Lau 
1982). In particular, "administrative absorption ofpolitics" is a well known notion 
explaining the political stability of Hong Kong. According to King (1981)，the 
British rulers relied on the strategy of synarchy and methods of elite-mass 
integration to ensure the stability of the colony. Under the synarchical principle, 
members of the Chinese elite were coopted into the administration process of the 
government, either by recruiting them into the Executive Council, Legislative 
Council, Urban Council and other formal consultation channels, or by consulting 
the elite informally on specific issues. In this way, any emerging leader in the 
community who was capable of mobilizing the grassroots and initiating political 
action against the state was coopted to be a partner of the government. 
While King's focus is on the urban area, the notion of the “administrative 
absorption of politics" is extended to the New Territories by Kuan and Lau (1981). 
They find that in the rapid urbanization of the New Territories, the government 
relied considerably on the traditional leaders in the rural communities to facilitate 
the process of land resumption. The government offered the rural elite substantial 
material benefits in exchange for their cooperative attitude in rural development 
projects. This co-optation of the rural elite by the colonial state was expressed 
institutionally through the Heung Yee Kuk (HYK) and the Rural Committees 
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made up of leaders from each village. They were both important parts of the 
government's rural administration OVHners 1975). 
Kuan and Lau's (1979，1981) thesis is obviously a variant of the thesis of 
administrative absorption. It also resonates with Lau's (1982) general model of 
Hong Kong society which postulates a "minimally-integrated socio-political 
system" consisting a highly autonomous colonial state apparatus, a utilitarian 
familistic Chinese society and administrative absorption as the linkages between 
the two entities. 
Though large-scale and rapid urbanization in the New Territories started 
only in the 1970s，they attempt to explain this stability by tracing the historical 
development of colonial state - rural community relationship throughout the 
colonial history from 1898 to the 1970s. A strategy of rule parallel to the 
"administrative absorption of politics" strategy in the urban area was instituted. 
Local leaders with mobilizing capabilities were coopted by the colonial 
administration. 
Before British rule, Kuan and Lau argue that there was little linkage 
between the local gentry elite and the imperial government. The local economy 
was largely self-sufficient; local political and social order was maintained not by 
the central government, but by the position of the gentry class in the villages and 
village organizations. With the coming of the British, political self-government in 
the New Territories came to an end, though to the authors the British exerted little 
influence on the rural economy. While the penetration of the colonial government 
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was not extensive and intensive, it did create a co-existence of the formal political 
structure of the colonial state and an the informal structure of village leadership. 
The informal and formal political structures were connected under a 
model of"indirect rule." The original rural leaders became the mediators between 
the colonial administrative structure and the villagers. The government officials 
had to rely on the rural leaders to obtain information about the villages and to 
make sure their policies were enacted. Owing to this co-optation process, the rural 
leadership became differentiated into two distinct types. One was the traditional 
informal leaders or elders based on their seniority in their clans. Another was 
leaders based on their connection with the outside world, mainly the government. 
When the modernization process began to dissolve the communal solidarity of 
rural villages over the prewar period, the former kind of "traditional" leaders 
declined. It was the second kind of"modem" leaders who emerged as the pillar of 
colonial rule. 
‘ In the prewar period, the government's attitude towards rural leaders was 
generally supportive and sympathetic. The government's intervention in the 
selection of rural leaders was minimal; they seemed to have emerged 
spontaneously from the village community, on the basis of their education or their 
knowledge of the outside world. This period was regarded as the “golden age" of 
New Territories administration by the authors. 
By the 1950s, with the tremendous expansion of the urban population, the 
government began to expand the urban area into the mral area. In doing this, the 
principle of indirect rule, and the maintenance of the status quo in the New 
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Territories, was violated. Hence, a new kind of administrative strategy was 
required for the rural Hong Kong in order to "smoothen the process of planned 
change." The primary direction of the government's strategy was to support the 
more "progressive" factions of the rural leaders. 
Kuan and Lau call the process the "resuscitation" ofrural leadership. With 
the progress of modernization, rural leaders would have faded away without 
government intervention as communal solidarity declined. By giving some rural 
leaders an official status and a role in colonial governance, their leadership role 
could be buttressed. In such a way, these rural leaders became a useful ally o f the 
government in enacting its developmental policies in the New Territories. The 
new ruling strategy was termed "neo-indirect rule." On the one hand, the basic 
structure of indirect rule, i.e. the reliance on the rural leaders to rule the New 
Territories, was not altered fundamentally, but, on the other hand, the ultimate 
goal of the indirect rule had been changed from maintaining the status quo o f the 
New Territories into facilitating its "modernization." 
The strategy of neo-indirect rule was essentially one of "incentive 
dispensation." Between the colonial state and village leaders, the former exerted 
influence over the village leaders by manipulating the distribution of material 
benefits flowing from the developmental process. Information about the 
developmental plan not open to the public was highly valuable to the village 
leaders as it helped them predict the movement of land values in particular 
localities and enable them to reap enormous profits in land deals. Compensation 
from the government in the course of land resumption also provided concrete 
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material benefits to the leaders. By distributing these benefits to the cooperative 
village leaders and restricting benefits from less compliant ones, the government 
succeeded in soliciting cooperation from most of the rural leaders towards the 
government's developmental plans. 
Between the village leaders and villagers, the same principle of"incentive 
dispensation" operated. Village leaders were always successful in ensuring the 
cooperation of their villagers by manipulating the material benefits generated by 
the development process and meted out by the government. As a result, the 
development process of the rural area that began in the 1950s and culminated 
after the 1970s could be carried out smoothly through this strategy of 
manipulating the flow of material benefits. 
Lau and Kuan's historical narrative and their analysis of the critical period 
of planned development are important in that they attempt to offer an account of 
how the colonial institutions were geared towards the changing social structure in 
the New Territories. Their arguments are also useful in providing a macro 
interpretation of the overall changes in political structure and state-society 
relations. However, their arguments are not flawless. With the benefit of the 
theoretical insights that can be gleaned from the new theories ofstate and colonial 
state in particular, we can easily find the limitation oftheir arguments. Also, i f w e 
make a serious attempt to draw from the existing ethnographic and historical 
studies of the New Territories, we can also locate gaps in their analyses. 
A first question is what does "rural stability" mean. Kuan and Lau never 
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attempt to define this crucial dependent variable in their analysis explicitly, but 
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they appear to take it as the absence of large-scale anti-colonial or anti-
govemmental movements during the period of planned development, especially 
during the occasion when the state appropriated land for development. Construed 
this way, it is undeniable that the New Territories was relatively stable, compared 
with other Third World countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, parts of pre-
liberation China or the early postwar Korea. Nevertheless, such a conception of 
the New Territories as peaceful and conflict-free is not entirely justified in that it 
overlooks other forms and sources of conflicts. For one thing, anti-colonial 
struggles did arise during the early colonial period. During the post Second World 
War years, a spate of ethnographic and anthropological studies unearthed a large 
number of conflicts between landlords and tenants, between indigenous 
inhabitants and new immigrants, and between rural villagers and the colonial 
government. Even Chau and Lau's (1982) study of the So Kun Wat village 
mentions a number of conflicts between the indigenous villagers and immigrant 
farmers. While it is indisputable that large-scale anti-colonial struggles were not 
common in the New Territories, we should not ignore the occurrences of these 
smaller scale conflicts. Hence, we should not frame the problem as why there 
were no conflicts in the New Territories at all, but: what were the principal 
sources of these sporadic conflicts? Why did they not spread beyond their narrow 
confines and cumulated into larger scale upheavals? 
Another problem concerns the changes that followed the British 
colonization. Their postulated stage of indirect rule assumes that the degree of 
penetration by the colonial state into the village level was very low, at least until 
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the postwar years. Hence, the stability of the New Territories before the period of 
planned development (or neo-indirect rule) was actually based on the co-optation 
ofcommunity leaders into governmental consultative machinery. Young's (1994) 
discussion of the African colonial state, however, highlights a different, complex, 
process for building hegemony over the indigenous society. Young's delineation 
of the imperatives of the construction of colonial state contrasts sharply with 
Kuan and Lau's argument of"indirect rule," in which the presence of the colonial 
state in the New Territories was minimal in the e^ ly decades of colonial 
expansion. Here I am inclined more towards Young's interpretation of the 
colonization process. I believe that Kuan and Lau tend to underestimate the 
magnitude of change as a result of the colonial conquest. 
Thirdly, Kuan and Lau argue that inthe 1950s the traditional leaders of the 
New Territories were on the verge of total demise. Had it not been for the 
intervention of the government, t h e ( H ^ ) w o u l d have met with its own demise. 
However, as Chung points out in his study of rural leadership, “the time frame of 
their ‘resuscitation，is not clear" (1988: 17). He argues that Kuan and Lau “have 
only supported their claim that rural leaders have declined in power with post-
1957 data.... If rural leaders could not maintain their vitality after the fifties, it 
might well be asked why they were ‘resuscitated’ by the government in the first 
place” (1988:17; emphasis in original). Indeed, we can go further and ask whether 
it is possible for the decline to set in as a result of the resuscitation in the 1950s. I 




loosely，and sometimes inconsistently, in accounting for the relations between the 
rural leaders and the administration. 
The resuscitation thesis lies at the core ofKuan and Lau's "administrative 
absorption" interpretation of rural stability: stability must be premised upon the 
establishment of some kind of linkage between the government and the rural 
communities through the co-optation of representative leaders from the 
communities themselves. My analysis shall cast doubt on this thesis by arguing 
that what happened in the 1950s with respect to the HYK was not only to 
"revitalize" it but to "reconstitute" it according to the blueprint of the government. 
Whether the reconstituted HYK was representative of the rural communities in 
the New Territories was not a key issue, but whether they were supportive of 
governmental development programmes was. Indeed, the process ofreconstitution 
was also part and parcel of the colonial state's long-standing efforts to build a 
governing coalition with specific segments of the mral leadership. Kuan and Lau 
appear to take the official definition of the effectiveness o f the HYK for granted, 
bi the eyes ofgovemment officials, the unreformed, conservative HYK leadership 
might have been perceived as ineffective at mediating between the government 
and the rural residents, but it did play a persistent role in mobilizing rural 
opposition to state development plans. Therefore, only by equating the HYK with 
a governmental “transmission belt," as the government did, could we say that it 
had been weakened in the 1950s, because the government did not want to deal 
with it any more. Looking at it from another perspective, we can say that the 
“resuscitation，’ weakened the HYK as a base for resisting state development plans. 
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A fourth problem of the thesis lies with the role ofimmigrant farmers. By 
their own account, Kuan and Lau recognize that immigrants who came to the New 
Territories after the Second World War were actually in the majority by the 1970s. 
From the information they quote, only about 20% of the total population in the 
New Territories were indigenous "original inhabitants" (11). In Chau and Lau 
(1982)，instances of conflict between the immigrant farmers and their indigenous 
landlords are also reported, and between the former and the government in the 
land resumption process. The immigrants' position in the rural society as well as 
the parts they took in "disrupting" or "preserving" the rural stability that the 
colonial government wanted to maintain is therefore an important question. Were 
conflicts involving the immigrant farmers pervasive? If the answer is yes, it will 
cast doubt on the picture of rural stability presented in studies by Chau, Kuan and 
Lau. Even if the answer is negative and that the immigrant farmers had not taken 
part in sustained resistance to planned development, a more adequate 
interpretation of the reasons and the process must be fashioned. Chau and Lau 
seem to believe that the same administrative absorption strategy worked on the 
immigrants as well as on the original inhabitants in dampening mral conflicts. My 
analysis suggests the picture was a bit more complicated than this. 
A deeper question concerning Kuan and Lau's interpretation ofsocial and 
• political changes in the New Territories is its underlying assumption deriving 
from the modernization approach. In their view, the socio-economic 
transformation of rural society appears to have been an evolutionary and natural 
process which generated a "push-pull" effect to make more and more villagers 
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abandon agricultural production and migrate to the city. At the same time, the 
modernization process eroded the traditional, earth-bound and particularistic rural 
communities based on kinship ties. For the authors, however, these socio-
economic changes are treated as spontaneous processes largely unrelated to state 
actions, at least not until the state embarked on the large-scale programme of 
planned development in the 1970s. This also converges with the authors' 
interpretation of the limited changes in the New Territories in the early colonial 
period. The New Territories is viewed as a traditional enclave in a modernizing 
society, untouched by social and political changes which were basically an urban 
phenomenon. The colonization process merely superimposed a thin layer of 
administration largely irrelevant to the governance of the villages. In this thesis, I 
shall argue that the influence of the colonial state on the rural society was in fact 
bigger than they portrayed and that the process of modernization in the New 
Territories cannot be construed as autonomous from state action. 
Given the limitations of the previous literature to account for the rural 
stability in Hong Kong, a new framework of explanation is necessary, bi the 
following chapter, I will reconstruct current literature on collective action and 




Literature on Collective Action 
Literature on Peasant Resistance: Divergent Forms ofPeasant Resistance 
Inspired by twentieth-century agrarian revolutions in the Third World, 
many students of peasant societies cast their efforts on locating the sources of 
contemporary rural unrest. (Wolf 1968; Migdal 1974; Paige 1975; Scott 1976; 
Popkin 1978; Skocpol 1979) Most of them converge at the point that the stress 
imposed by a centralizing state and commercializing economy' on the village is 
the ultimate force pushing the "inward-oriented" peasants onto the road of 
insurgency. 
Given the expanding colonial state and capitalist world economy as the 
common backgrounds, variations in indigenous communities' power structure (e.g. 
class structure, degree of landlord control, relation of production, forms of 
solidarity) would bring different peasants' responses to the same stress. Studies in 
the field are concentrated in finding which strata of cultivators, under what 
immediate institutional environment, are most prone to engage in insurrection. 
Undoubtedly, these studies are pioneering and insightful. But a new spate 
of research has begun to revise their views. 
On different forms ofpeasant resistance 
‘ I t is argued that the expansion of capitalist economy is a politically mediated process in the 
colonial world. (Migdal 1974) 
2 Paige (1975) is different from others as he focuses on the class relation between cultivators and 
non-cultivators in agricultural production. In his eyes, process of state-making and 
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The former studies of peasant resistance are criticized for its indulgence in 
large scale rebellions and negligence of other forms of peasant resistance. Later 
researchers tum their attention to more covert forms of resistance known as 
"everyday forms of resistance" or "avoidance resistance".(Scott 1985; Adas 1981) 
This covert resistance is supposed to exist every time and everywhere in the rural 
society. Hence it can be taken as a constant. The only variable thing is how, when, 
and under what conditions would this covert resistance transform itself into open 
conflicts. 
A few case studies illustrate how specific socio-political contexts give rise 
to different manifestations of open peasant protests. Scott (1985: 242-8; 1990: 
202-29) finds that high level repression (or perceived high level repression) may 
make cultivators' hidden resistance difficult to become open collective action. 
Adas (1981,1988) and Bernhardt (1992)，also observe in their cases that peasants 
tend to rely on avoidance resistance under state's minimal intervention through 
indirect rule, but engage in overt and large scale revolt when the state manages to 
police and penetrate forcefully into the societies. Here we have two apparently 
conflicting arguments on the relation between state capabilities and peasant 
resistance forms? So far, there are no studies theorizing the relation between 
different socio-political contexts faced by the peasant and their choice of 
resistance forms. The situations described by the above authors seems particular 
commercialization only impact on peasant societies indirectly. Skocpol's (1979) argument also 
differed from others. She thinks that peasant revolts were triggered by state breakdown. 
3 The discrepancy between these two propositions are parallel, to a certain extend, with the 
divergence in Skocpol's and Tilly's views on peasant rebellion. While the former tells us how 
state breakdown conduce to rural uprisings, the latter regards the expansion of a modem state as 
the source of peasant rebellions. (Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1982) 
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and unique in each case. But what can be sure is that peasant resistance is more 
than one form. It could be converted from one form to another under some 
specific conditions. 
Further, Turton (1986) calls our attention to the "middle-grounds" 
between large scale insurgency and hidden protest. Those "in-between" may be 
collective protests of more localized and sporadic forms, or more institutionalized 
ways of protests and negotiations. Turton's characterization replaces the 
dichotomous picture of peasant resistance by a more sophisticated landscape, 
though it has not been followed by many new explorations yet. 
On specific patterns of state structure and state-society relation 
A second criticism towards the literature is that it has over-generalized the 
actual processes of imperialism, as well as the impacts resulted. According to 
Skocpol: 
[T]he macro-historical context for Wolf, Migdal, and Paige is 
envisaged in global rather than cross-national terms. In one way or 
another, each of these authors stresses imperialistic Western 
capitalism as the fundamental promoter of peasant revolutions. The -
not insignificant - differences among them have to do with exactly 
how this world-historical force is conceived and the specific ways in 
which it influences or creates potentially revolutionary peasant forces. 
(1994: 230) 
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To take into consideration the specificity of different forms of colonialism, one 
must focus on the diversities of colonial state structure and colonial state -
indigenous society relation. 
It is therefore useful to bring in recent discussion on colonial or post-
colonial state in the Third World. In the literature, state-making is regarded as a 
complex process involving complicated struggles between different segments of 
state and criss-crossing social forces from national to local level. Efforts of state 
building may result in various forms of state governance structure and state-
society relation. States may vary in their degree of centralization, level of 
repression, relation with different social forces, as well as capabilities of 
penetrating into the society. (Boone 1994; Migdal 1988，1994; Young 1994) 
Hence, the form and impact of a centralizing state should no longer be 
taken as a given and constant background in our studies of peasant resistance. The 
monocasual analysis explaining peasants' potentials to revolt solely by variations 
in local power structure or state structure (as presented in Adas and Bemhardt's 
works) should also be abandoned. Rather, we need to analyze the specific 
structure of colonial state and institutional connection between state and society 
together. State-society relation can be deciphered through an examination into the 
alliance and cleavage between the state, local elite and peasantry. 
Discussion 
The discussion on forms of peasant resistance enables us to classify 
varieties ofpeasant resistance into a scale from the most covert to the most overt 
ones. Though the current literature does not give a satisfactory explanation for the 
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divergent patterns of peasant reaction to modernization, most of them tend to see 
different forms of rural protests as induced by different institutional settings in the 
rural society. The process of state building and forms of state control in the 
countryside, as well as the indigenous social structure in the villages are the major 
institutional settings that may play a significant role in determining the forms of 
rural conflicts. To formulate a rigorous explanatory framework on rural protests, 
we may also lend insights from the current discussion on social movement which 
is much concentrated on explaining the collective action in the urban area. 
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Literature on Social Movement: State and Organization 
As most studies on social movements put their focus on the collective 
protest in an urban settings with a Westem democratic polity, the theorems 
derived from the literature are difficult to be applied directly to the colonial 
developing society as the case of rural Hong Kong. Insights drawn from the 
literature are modified and hypothesis will be formulated by putting those insights 
into the context of the village society ofHong Kong. 
Political Opportunities: State and Social Protests 
The interaction between national politics and social movements at national 
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or local level is first examined by Tilly et al (1972，1975，1978) under the political 
process model. It is more or less derived from the Resource Mobilization model 
assuming the rational calculation of the collective actors. As seen before, Tilly 
sees social movements as actions initiated by the contenders who are excluded 
from the polity. Also, if social protests are initiated by rational actors, it can be 
expected that they only launch actions when the costs are lowest, the benefits are 
most and the probability of success are highest. It is upon these presumptions that 
the linkage between the polity and social protests is examined. 
First, social protests are most likely to occur when the balance of power 
within a polity becomes unstable, or when the new balance of power has not been 
consolidated yet. These situations can be found usually in the years before and 
after a national election, after a revolution or when government faces economic 
and military crises. Social protests flourish in these situation because 
‘[g]eneralized political instability destroys any semblance of a political status quo, 
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thus encouraging collective action by all groups sufficiently organized to contest 
the structuring of a new political order.' (McAdam 1982: 42) 
Second, social protests are unlikely to happen when there is high-handed 
repression from the government because it may render the cost of initiating a 
social protest too high. On the contrary, when the government does not rely so 
much on repression to deal with the challengers, social protests may flourish. 
(Synder and Tillyl972) 
At last, with the organizational strength and the resources of a protest 
group kept constant, a social protest would have a higher chance of success if 
different members in the polity is aligned in a way that the balance of power 
inclines towards the elite supporting or at least is sympathetic with the protesting 
group. It is proved by Jenkins and Perrow's study on the farm workers 
movements in USA from 1946 to 1972. (1977) 
The above political model of social movements is said to be a neo-pluralist 
approach. (Jenkins 1995) The pluralistic conception of the polity and society is 
the source of the major problems of this approach. 
On the one hand, the polity is seen as an empty arena at which different 
contenders compete for political power and political influence. It is problematic 
provided the fact that states in different countries are often biased towards some 
specific social groups. Some try to revise this model by saying that the members 
of the polity do not compete in an unbiased arena but struggle in a given 
institutional setting. (Kriesi 1995) It undoubtedly brings the political opportunities 
model closer to reality, but it has not solved the central problem. The polity is still 
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regarded as a pure arena. The state bureaucrats are unnoticed as if they are merely 
unimportant neutral administrators and mediators in the polity. 
The shortcomings of this perspective are clearly seen in the Hong Kong 
context where the political power has been monopolized by the colonial 
administration. It is ridiculous to say that the colonial state does not have its own 
interests and concerns. After the academic movement of 'bringing the state back 
in' (Evan et al. 1985)，more and more scholars view the state apparatus as an actor 
actively pursuing its own interests, rather than an neutral arena for political 
struggles. The state may be more pervasive and sometime less predominant vis-a-
vis different excluded or included social groups. It is unwise to neglect the 
independent effect of the state's activities on the rise and fall of social movements， 
especially in Hong Kong where the predominance of colonial state power is so 
obvious. 
Another serious problem of the model is that it sees society as an entity 
made up of different interest groups contesting for material interests in different 
ways. The groups included in the polity pursuit their interests through institutional 
method while the excluded groups do so through social movements. The problem 
here is twofold. First, different interests groups occupy different positions in a 
hierarchical social structure, no matter if they are excluded or included into the 
polity. We should not neglect the fact that different groups do have different 
resources and power at start. These initial political and social inequalities cannot 
be understood by just considering the wins and losses of the actors in the power 
game at the previous round, but should be explained in terms of the historical 
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development of the socio-economic and political system. The inequality between 
original inhabitants and the immigrant tenant farmers in rural Hong Kong is a 
good example. 
More, it is not easy to classify social groups into ones included in and ones 
excluded from the polity. The classification may be true if we are talking about 
Westem democratic societies in which the "state" can be studied as a separable 
category from the "civil society". But it is not true in the context of rural Hong 
Kong. Most of the village headman in the New Territories are members of the 
Heung Yee Kuk which are the recognized consultation channel between the rural 
elite and the colonial state. But are they excluded or included members of the 
polity? Are the grassroots rural communities under them excluded or included 
members? It is difficult to say. Sometimes the rural elite may speak for their 
corresponding grassroots communities or even struggle with the government for 
them, in order to let their interests be considered in the policy making process. 
Sometimes the rural elite act as the brokers of the colonial state and suppress the 
voices and demands of their fellow villagers. The included social group / 
excluded social group dichotomy is an oversimplistic classification for the case of 
Hong Kong. 
A remark should be made with regard to the level of state repression as a 
variable affecting the formation of protest actions. It is argued that high level of 
state repression is unfavourable to formation of collective action. However, in our 
case of rural Hong Kong, repression of the state cannot be taken as a variable, as 
we do not observe any variation of its level over the colonial rule. Though the 
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repressiveness of the police power tumed higher in the period of civil 
disturbances in 1967, it was brief and in most of the other times, the state 
repression level remained somewhat in-between the liberal state in Westem 
democratic societies and the authoritative state in the developing countries. How 
the specific level of state repression in Hong Kong affect rural mobilization can 
only be discerned in a cross-area comparison taking rural societies under 
authorities with different level of repression into account. In my comparative case 
analysis of rural Hong Kong, the level of state repression is taken as a constant. 
On the other hand, what matters in the case of rural Hong Kong is the 
level of repression exercised by the local elite within the village communities. 
Theorists of political opportunities structure assume political opportunities 
structure to work through creating or reducing the possibility for the protest 
groups to find an ally O)ossibly an elected officials) within the state, hence 
increasing and reducing the expected chance of success and probability of 
mobilization. But the situation of rural Hong Kong is different from that in the 
urban democratic societies in the West. In the close-knitted village community of 
the New Territories in which the influence and predominance of the rural elite are 
down to the everyday life of the villagers, it is not difficult to presume that the 
political opportunities structure, that is, the opportunities structure conditioned by 
the alliance and cleavages between these rural elite and the state, affect the 
probability of rural mobilization through providing a repressive or less repressive 
environment for the emergence ofprotest. In other words, suppression of the local 
elite becomes the most important intermediate factor between the political 
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opportunities structure and the formation of collective protest in the rural setting 
ofHong Kong. We can even take the existence of rural elite's suppression or not 
as a concrete measurement of political opportunities structure in the village. 
All in all, it is misleading to conceptualize the political opportunities 
structure confronting a protest group on the base of a pluralistic model of polity 
and society in our cases, and to take all features of the "political opportunities 
structure" outlined in the literature into account. Here I try to put forward an 
alternative model for the political opportunities structure in the New Territories: 
The political structure of the rural society in Hong Kong is a continuous 
hierarchy, with the state apparatus at the top and the village communities at the ‘ 
bottom. Between the top and bottom, there are interlocking levels of 
intermediating elite who are co-opted by the state and incorporated into the 
policy making process in different ways and degrees. Second, the alliance and 
cleavages between the elite and the state are not stable, though not random. 
Sometimes the co-opted elite may be repressive, hence act as a negative factor to 
the protest, but sometimes they would turn non-repressive and become a positive 
(or at least neutral) factor. In addition, we may expect the existence of elite who 
are in-between, that is, who are supportive in some aspects but repressive in other. 
It is also natural to think that the attitudes of different elite groups towards a 
specific social protest are not arbitrary, but are rooted at their structural positions 
as well as their strategic calculation of self-interests. This alternative 
conceptualization of political opportunities structure is similar to the state-rural 
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gentry class-peasants communities model used by Skocpol (1979) in her study of 
peasants uprisings during the French, Russia and Chinese Revolution. 
Organization and Social Protest 
Since the rise of the Resource Mobilization theory, organization was 
regarded as an important factor for mobilizing protest actions. Based on this 
common premise, there are controversies over which kind of organizations would 
facilitate the collective protests. 
McCarthy and Zald (1977) think that discontent and grievances exist all 
the times. They are transformed into social movements only when they are 
defined, created, and manipulated by resourceful issue entrepreneurs and 
organizations. Resources such as money, facilities, labour and time are crucial in 
the making of social movements. They divide participants of social movements 
into two main groups: the conscience constituents and beneficiary constituents. 
The conscience constituents are usually from the elite class and so possess more 
resources. On the contrary, the beneficiary constituents of a social movement 
organization always come from the lower classes and have little resources except 
their labour. The two groups constitute the elite and mass of the movements. 
McCarthy and Zald state that pre-existing networks among the mass act as 
infrastructure and preconditions for mobilization. ‘Social movements whose 
related populations are highly organized (either communally or associationally) 
are more likely than are others to spawn organized forms' (1218). Nevertheless, 
the lateral integration of the mass alone does not lead to the emergence of a 
movement. Resources delivered by the elite are also necessary. 
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Hence, any social movement organization is highly dependent on the elite 
support as they are the major sources of resources, though it is nearly impossible 
to have a movement does not consist of beneficiary constituents. So the formula 
for the generation of a social movement is: indigenous or pre-existing networks + 
elite intervention from outside. 
This elitist conception of social movements is refuted by Piven and 
Cloward (1991) who think that elite support not only does not facilitate the 
growth of collective action, but also hinder it. Elite in the society is more or less 
embedded into the institution of the established order. Piven and Cloward argue 
that the vertical integration between the mass and the elite would make the social 
movement, if any, shift to the moderate form acceptable to themselves. It prevents 
the social protests of the powerless from creating disruptions to the established 
social order the breakdown of which may bring many benefits to the oppressed. 
Second, Piven and Cloward show that empirically, social protests, 
especially the violent ones such as ghetto riots and peasants revolts, are more 
likely to arises at times when the ties between the elite class and the indigenous 
community are broken. It is the violent uprising which lacks the participation of 
elite and creates disruption to the dominant institution brings most benefits to the 
oppressed. Now we come to an alternative formula for the generation of social 
protest: pre-existing networks + withdrawal of the influence of the elite. 
We see clearly that McCarthy and Zald on the one hand, and Piven and 
Cloward on the other are on opposing sides with regard to the role of elite in 
social movements. The former contends that elite or outside organizers are 
32 
essential to the movements while the latter argues that elite is bad for the 
movements. In fact, the arguments on both sides are over-generalized and it is just 
difficult to choose between the two. There are many kinds of elite in our society 
who occupy different structural positions. They never share the same attitude and 
influence to different social movements. It is senseless to make simplistic 
statements like ‘elite hinders social movements' or ‘elite facilitates social 
movements'. 
Maybe we can tackle the problem by drawing insights from the study of 
peasant revolution in the France, Russia and China by Skocpol (1979). Skocpol's 
interpretation of Russian and French Revolution supports the arguments of Piven 
Cloward. The political crisis at 1789 in France and 1917 in Russia led to the 
bankruptcy of the despotic state as well as the landlords who were the brokers of 
the state in the countryside. Being relieved from the social control machine of the 
rural elite, the peasants, who had already been in solidarity in the rural community 
structure, raised immediately to fight for their interests and massive rural 
uprisings resulted. 
However, the interpretation of the Chinese Revolution by the same author 
seems to support the argument of McCarthy and Zald. According to Skocpol, the 
political crisis at the national level in China before 1949 had not led to the decline 
of the rural gentry class. The peasant communities were weak in front of the 
social control machinery of the landlords. Massive peasants uprisings did not 
appear until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), formed by the urban elite 
embracing communist ideology and were excluded by the state, went to the 
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countryside and mobilized the peasants. In this case, the elite from the CCP 
played an important facilitating role in the making of peasants' collective action. 
Skocpol's focus is on the effect of state crisis on social revolution. The 
roles of different elite (the landlords and the CCP) in the peasant revolts are not 
very much conceptualized. But when we put the opposing positions of McCarthy 
and Zald, Piven and Cloward, and the historical narrative ofSkocpol together, we 
can generate a synthetic conceptual framework about the role of elite in collective 
actions: There are different kinds of organizations outside the indigenous 
organizations. They may be helpful to the collective action of a definite 
community or not. It depends on the relation between the organization and the 
authority, or in other words, the autonomy of the organization vis-a-vis the state. 
But more strictly speaking, it is always difficult to distinguish organizations 
outside the indigenous society or inside. Taken the example of CCP in pre-
liberation again, it was hardly to say that it was solely an elite organization out of 
the village, provided that it had absorbed a large numbers of villagers in its base 
area as members. The "outside-ness" or "inside-ness" of an organization with 
respect to the indigenous community is ambiguous in many cases. 
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Concluding Remarks 
To summarize briefly，we can see from the literature that: 
(1) Peasant resistance can take many forms under different socio-political 
conditions. While covert resistance of the peasants (or the everyday life resistance 
of the peasants) is everywhere, different forms of overt resistance would emerge 
out of different structural and institutional settings. 
(2) One important factor moulding the form of collective action or social protest 
is the political opportunities structure, which can be defined in the context of the 
New Territories by interlocking layers of co-optation from the state down to the 
grassroots village communities. The suppression of the local elite is the principal 
aspect of the political opportunities structure within the village. The role of the 
elite is not necessarily negative to the protest actions. Sometimes they can 
withdraw their suppression and let protests grow. This depends on the contingent 
alliance or cleavages between them and the authority. 
(3) There are different kinds of organization outside of the indigenous society 
which may be helpful to the social protests or not. The "helpfulness" of the 
organization basically depends on its autonomy from the state. 
These three points are useful for our construction of a conceptual 
framework in explaining rural protests in Hong Kong. The first point can be 
applied to construct our dependent variables - the forms of rural resistance, 
whereas the second and third point can be applied to the construction of the 
independent variable - the political opportunities structure in the village and the 
existence of autonomous organizations. 
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Chapter 3 
Elite intervention and Organization: Independent Variables in the 
Analysis of Rural Protest Intensity 
From the literature review above, we can spot two important variables 
explaining the occurrence and pattem of social protest. One is the political 
opportunity structure confronted by the actors, and the other is the presence or 
absence of any movement organization autonomous from the state. Below, I am 
going to further qualify these variables by putting them into the political and 
social contexts of the New Territories. 
The Varying Political Opportunity Structure 
The police repression level of the authority in Hong Kong has remained 
constantly low, except the turbulent year of 1967 and a few years afterward, when 
the colonial state resorted to high-handed oppression of any suspected leftist 
activity in the territory. The serious problem the protesters face was always not 
the physical oppression of the state, but the deterrence by the local elite. The 
presence of elite suppression or not became the most important aspect of the 
political opportunities structures confronting the actors of (potential) collective 
protests. 
In the New Territories, the strata of rural elite were organized into the 
Heung Yee Kuk-Rural Committee-Village Representative hierarchy. These strata 
of rural elite were constituted by the colonial state into a hegemonic power in the 
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village. However, the fact that they were constituted by the colonial state does not 
mean that they must be on the side of the state to keep rural stability and hence 
forestalling any mobilization against the government all the time. In fact, the 
alliance between the state and the elite strata was not a strictly static one and 
involves strategic calculation on both sides, though the elite's interests were 
coincidental with those of the colonial authority most of the time. Hence, we 
cannot simply presume that the elite would play a suppressive role in all villagers' 
mobilization. 
We should rather take the elite suppression of the mobilization as a 
variable than a constant. The presence of elite suppression may vary from case to 
case. Before deciphering the varying political opportunities structure in each case, 
I i we have to investigate into the historical formation of the rural elite and the 
I I 
development of their alliance with the colonial state. '' 
Historical Development of State-Rural Elite Alliance 
(l)The pre-World War II period 
Chiu and Hung (1996，1997) outline the trajectory along which the 
colonial state institutionalized its rule over the New Territories before the Second 
World War. It involved principally the building ofan alliance with the rural elite. 
In the pre-colonial period, the present territories of Hong Kong was 
dominated by the five great clans, especially the Tangs clan. Most Hakka villagers 
rented land from the great clans and were dominated politically and economically 
by the Tangs. Besides holding most fertile land in the territory, the great clans 
maintained their hegemony through holding most seats in the local government 
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offices, controlling the market towns and charging the peasants trading their 
products there, as well as extracting a portion of land tax submitted by the weaker 
villages to the Imperial state. 
A large-scale anti-British campaign was organized to resist the 
establishment of colonial rule by the great clans. After the British defeated the 
great clans militarily, they institutionalized their colonial rule by building up an 
alliance with the Hakka villagers and marginalizing the great clans. A ‘land 
reform，was implemented to grant most land originally owned by the great clans 
to the Hakka tenants cultivating on it. District Offices were also set up in the New 
Territories to replace the great clans as arbitrators among the villagers and 
different villages. 
In these ways, the colonial state successfully replaced the preexisting 
hegemony of the gentry-landlord class with its own hegemony in the New 
Territories. This laid the political and economic framework of colonial 
domination, leading to the postwar patterns of development and constrained 
resistance. In contrast to Kuan and Lau's formulation that indirect rule and 
minimal intervention into rural communities were maintained in the prewar period, 
the colonial state had in fact imposed its substantial influence on rural 
communities and transformed their socio-economic configurations considerably 
since the early period of colonial rule. 
(2) Postwar Development: Expansion of the Colonial State 
Before the Second World War, the New Territories were no more than a 
buffer of defense between the mainland and the city of Victoria. There were few 
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construction works in the region, except the building of the Kowloon-Canton 
railway and roads for military and administrative purposes. While legal and 
administrative frameworks (the imposition of private land ownership and the 
system ofDistrict Offices) for economic and political intervention by the colonial 
state had been laid out before the war, the colonizers had not been interested in 
utilizing these frameworks to develop the area. The raison d'etre o f t h e Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong was trade, not agrarian or primary extraction; the New 
Territories had no immediate economic significance to the colonial administration, 
although they were expected to supply a portion o f the food consumption for the 
urban area. 
The situation changed in the 1950s when the influx of immigrants and 
industrialization in urban areas prompted the state to intervene more deeply and 
directly into the New Territories. First, land was appropriated extensively from 
the villagers for development purpose, such as building a reservoir for the urban 
population and providing space for new industrial or residential towns (Bristow 
1984). Secondly, agricultural production was increasingly put under the colonial 
state's regulation. While the government had not intervened and supported 
specifically the industrial takeoff directly owing to historical and institutional 
constraints (Chiu 1996)，it resorted to a varieties ofadministrative means to lower 
the cost of labour reproduction in general (Schiffer 1991). One of these means 
was the intensive intervention into the production and trade (both domestic and 
international) of agricultural products to ensure a stable provision of essential 
foodstuffs at low prices. 
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The administrative apparatus was also reconstituted and new institutions 
invented by the state to facilitate its increased involvement into New Territories 
affairs. This included the creation of Rural Committees and the forced 
reconstitution of HYK in the realm of politics, as well as the establishment of 
local cooperatives and the Vegetable Marketing Organization (VMO) serving 
both economic and social purposes. 
(3) Heung Yee Kuk: Reconstitution ofRural Politics 
Though the Tangs and other great clans had declined since the nineteenth 
century and been deprived of their political and economic privileges in the 
process of colonization, and most Hakka villages had been detached from their 
control, they were still wealthy and influential in rural Hong Kong. After the war, 
a sign of their influence was their control o f the HYK until the late 1950s. The 
conservatism of this once powerful gentry class and its domination of the HYK 
made it an oppositional agency hostile to the colonial government and its 
development projects. It was only through high-handed maneuvers the clans could 
be marginalized politically and the HYK be reconstituted into a compliant broker 
for the state. 
During the Second World War, a village representative system was 
established under Japanese rule. The New Territories were divided into smaller 
sub-districts. Leaders were chosen (usually from village elders) in each sub-
district to “deal with the authorities and their own people, to meet the potential 
threat to themselves arising from misdemeanors, crime and anti-Japanese activity" 
(Hayes 1984:60). Facing the difficult situation after the war, the returned British 
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inherited this Japanese system. The whole New Territories were divided into 28 
administrative areas and one Rural Committee was formed in each o f t h e m / One 
or two village representatives were selected from each village to form the 
Committees.^ 
Rural Committees were the recognized mediators between agrarian 
communities and the government and were also the recognized representative of 
the New Territories people: 
The rural committees have as yet no statutory existence or powers, 
exercising only such functions as the district officer sees fit to 
delegate, in which some are more successful than others. Most of 
them, however, have already proved their usefulness not only as 
mouthpieces of public opinion, but also in the arbitration of local 
clan and family disputes and generally as a bridge between the 
administration and the people (District Commissioner 1956:13). 
These village representatives, with their monopolization of information 
from the outside world, soon displaced the village elders and seized power in the 
lineage.6 Naturally, the unofficial HYK's limited status as villagers-administration 
mediator was threatened by these committees. The HYK quickly responded to this 
crisis by adopting a new constitution in April 1950，converting itself from an 
4 The first Rural Committee was formed in 1947. By 1958，all 28 Committees had been founded. 
'Sometime, the forming ofthe rural committee leaderships went violent. Two examples were the 
bloody warfare between different local powers competing to control respective committees in 
Cheung Chau and Sap Pat Heung. See District Commissioner 1955，1961. 
41 
"autonomous voluntary association" into a "society of village representatives" 
(Lee 1984:171). The reformed HYK accepted as members only village 
representatives, serving directors and deputy executives in towns and villages. 
The new constitution also divided the whole New Territories into seven election 
districts, each producing a definite number of executive councillors of the HYK. 
In this way, the HYK successfully increased its influence from the northern New 
Territories to the whole New Territories. 
By then, the government could no longer afford to ignore the HYK's 
opinions. The HYK had become a more representative and stronger base of 
resistance against development plans whereas it was still under the control of the 
great clans. Before investigating how the government reconstituted the HYK and 
marginalized the great clans, let us first discuss how rural contradictions were 
shaped by the impulse of development in the 1950s. 
The Tangs had had a tense relation with the colonizers since the land 
reform and tax reform at the tum of the century. Their hostility towards the 
government was not only the result of past resentment but was fueled by new 
contradictions arising from the postwar years. The expansion of the urban area 
brought development projects to relatively accessible areas in the New Territories, 
such as Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin, Tai Po and Tuen Mun, which had been at the 
periphery of the rural power structure. The leaders of the Rural Committees in 
these areas tapped many benefits from these projects because of their cordial 
6 Sometime, the village representative and village elder were the same person, but most ofthe time 
they were not. The representative was usually a young and wealthy member of the lineage who 
was able to "buy" the support ofhis villagers. 
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relation with the colonial state.? They gradually emerged as a wealthy and 
powerful elite capable of challenging the political leadership of the great clans in 
the HYK. In contrast, grassroots villagers and tenants in the rapidly developing 
areas lost much and gained little. For them, development only meant undesirable 
resettlement and destruction of their livelihoods based on agriculture. This 
polarized the rural communities into a pro-development (or pro-government) 
camp made up of Rural Committees leaders from urbanizing areas and an anti-
development (anti-govemment) camp based on the alliance.of the great clans and 
members from the rural grassroots. Owing to their respective geographical 
distribution, they were known alternatively as the "Tsuen Wan faction" ^>ro-
development) and "Yuen Long faction" (anti-development). The former was led 
by Ho Chuen-yiu, Chan Yat-san and Cheung Yan-lung, while the latter by leaders 
of the Tang and Pang clans, for example, Tang Tak-yuk and Tang Hoi-yip.® The 
struggle between the two camps, alongside with their alliance or conflicts with the 
government, were the focus of political dynamics in the HYK over the decades. 
The early phrase of govemment-led development in the 1950s confronted 
strong resistance from the villagers. Any resumption of land and demolition of 
building structure would easily trigger off local mobilization. For an example, 
when the colonial administration tried to demolish some temporary structures on a 
piece of the Tangs' tong land in Yuen Long in June 1957, the clan reacted by 
7 According to Kuan and Lau (1979:33), the government offered a lot of resources in exchange for 
the rural leaders' cooperation. These resources included money, "land exchange entitlement" in 
compensation for land surrendered, advance information on development plans, rights to private 
development, etc. 
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mobilizing 2,000 villagers to demonstrate against the demolition. Violent 
confrontation was prevented only by a concession from the government granting 
the building of permanent structures on the same spot (Kuan and Lau 1979:21). 
Sometimes, rural oppositions were not confined to the local level. The 
construction of the Tai Lam Chung Reservoir was the biggest project in the 
decade, involving the resettlement of a cluster of villages. The building of an 
extensive catchwater system affected the water supply for paddy fields in a large 
area in the vicinity. The villagers affected refused to be sacrificed under the plan; 
negotiations for cash compensation or land exchange broke down, and many 
villagersjust refused to move. The construction project was delayed for years, and 
the issue rose to the political level when the HYK dominated by the anti-
development camp stood decisively on the villagers' side against the project, even 
at a time when the faction was beginning to be challenged: 
At Tai Lam the dam itself was finished before the start of the year 
under report, but a great deal of work remained to be done on the 
extensive northern catchwater system which is to supply one third of 
the water this reservoir can hold. There was considerable opposition 
to the construction of these catchwaters based primarily on genuine 
fears by fanners that they would lose their irrigation water but in 
addition stirred up by mischievous people for their own ends (District 
Commissioner 1959:10; emphasis added). 
8 See the Savingram from the Govemor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 3 March 1960 
on the HYK in CO 1030/1333 "Heung Yee Kuk." 
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Frequent protests against development projects eventually moved the 
colonial government to destroy the political influence of these “mischievous 
people" and reconstitute HYK into a complying institution. The opportunity came 
in the late 1950s when the internal struggle between the two camps intensified. 
From the mid-1950s onwards, the control of the HYK changed hands several 
times between the "Yuen Long faction" and the "Tsuen Wan faction" owing to 
maneuvers by each side. Though the "Yuen Long faction" always had control of 
the HYK, a new constitution was passed in 1955 to reshuffle the distribution of 
executive councillors from each of the seven election districts. Under the new rule, 
the number of councillors produced were determined by the population size of 
each district.' Besides, the chairman of each Rural Committee, who had benefited 
most from development projects, was assigned an ex-officio status. The power of 
the pro-development camp redoubled, and it was not surprising to find that Ho 
Chuen-yiu, chairman of Tsuen Wan Rural Committee, was elected the chairman 
of the HYK. Power changes were often accompanied by a radically different 
approach to government developmental policies. For example, a general assembly 
on 18 May 1956 resolved that the grassroots villagers would petition the 
Governor should he not accept the HYK's calling for an abandonment of current 
land policies restricting private conversions of rural land use. Yet, the petition was 
^ forestalled by Ho, thereby nullifying a mobilization against the government. 
The anti-development camp soon fought back. In an executive council 
meeting on 28 February 1957, "Yuen Long faction" managed somehow to revise 
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the constitution again. '�The n w constitution would certainly expel the "pro-
development" faction from leading positions in the election of the thirteenth term 
ofoff ice to be held in mid-1957. This rewriting of the constitution was regarded 
by Lee (1984:173) as a coup d'etat. The "Tsuen Wan faction" reacted by secretly 
persuading the heads of Rural Committees to boycott the election and gained the 
support of 21 out of 28 of them. The anti-development camp soon appealed 
directly to the rank-and-file village representatives who formed the electoral 
college. Most village representatives overruled their committee chairmen and 
supported the election. This was the case even in some bases of the "Tsuen Wan 
faction," such as Tai Po and Tuen Mun. 
When the HYK's internal struggle intensified, the District Commissioner, 
K. M. A. Bamett, seized the opportunity and started secret talks with the pro-
development camp. A plan was discussed of founding a new pro-government 
institution called the Council for Rural Administration so as to marginalize the 
anti-development camp. Then, in June 1957, a letter was issued from the 
government to the HYK urging it to be registered under the new Societies' 
Ordinance (Amendment) 1957 or else the HYK would become illegal. An 
extraordinary meeting of the executive council was held in July to discuss the 
letter. The meeting was dominated by anti-govemment voices, and it decided in a 
defiant mood against registration. Available information does not allow us to 
9 It gave the "Tsuen Wan faction" great advantage as they mostly came from urbanizing areas with 
a fast expanding population. 
'° Now the number of councillors from each election district was proportional to the number of 
village representatives there instead of its population size. The ex-officio status of Rural 
Committee chairmen was also canceled. Furthermore, the electoral college electing the councillors 
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ascertain whether the registration requirement was deliberately used by the 
colonial state against the HYK, but it did provide the legal basis for it to dissolve 
the HYK at any time. 
On the eve of the election in August, the government finally declared the 
HYK illegal. According to the District Commissioner: 
The government was concerned about some recent activities 
undertaken by certain people in the name of the Heung Yee Kuk. In 
view of the development of the events, the government has 
concluded that the Kuk has lost its value of representation and 
therefore should be disqualified from recognition (quoted by Kuan 
and Lau 1979:24). 
Chaos followed. The organization of the Council for Rural Administration was 
under way, demonstration, lawsuits were initiated by the "Yuen Long faction" 
against the state under the rubrics of the "Kuk Protection Committee" headed by 
Cheung Tai Wing and Tang Hoi Yip, and lobbying by the government and the 
two opponent groups were frequent." On 25 November, the government 
eventually introduced the Heung Yee Kuk Bill which was passed in the 
Legislative Council without discussion. In moving the first reading of the bill, the 
Colonial Secretary said: 
The immediate occasion for the introduction of this Bill arises from a 
dispute, or conflict, which has virtually prevented the Kuk from 
was no longer formed by the 28 Rural Committees' chairmen, but by all of the 900 village 
representatives. 
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functioning at all during the last two years. This unhappy state of affairs 
began as a dispute between two factions within the Kuk which led in late 
1957 to the withdrawal of the Government of recognition of the 
representative status of the Kuk. Matters finally developed into a dispute 
between one of these two factions on the one hand and the Government on 
the other. The point at issue was a very simple one: those who had by then 
assumed control of the Kuk maintained that the Government ought to treat 
that body as being authoritatively representative of New Territories 
opinion but should at the same time in no way concern itself with the 
question how the Kuk officials were elected — that is to say, with the 
Kuk's constitution - or with the question whether the Kuk was truly 
representative (emphasis added).'^ 
Essentially, the government's point was that it had to be satisfied with the 
composition of the HYK before it could be recognized as the representative of 
rural opinions. Under the bill, the essence of the 1955 constitution was restored, 
and pro-government elements were strengthened. Chairmen of Rural Committee 
regained the ex-officio status, and the electoral college was constituted by 28 
chairmen again. The Justices of the Peace appointed by the Governor were 
assigned ex-officio statuses too. The "Tsuen Wan faction" led their supporters to 
register the HYK under this ordinance on 11 December 1959, making it a 
statutory organization. Lying in front of the anti-government forces were two 
‘‘See the Savingram from the Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 3 March 
1960 on the HYK in CO 1030/1333 "Heung Yee Kuk." 
'2 CO 1030/1333 "Heung Yee Kuk," p. 9. Extracts from Legislative Council proceedings. 
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choices. They could either boycott the reconstituted HYK and risk losing any 
influence over it or join it to exert as much influence as possible. They chose the 
latter. The election of councillors was staged in 1960，and not surprisingly the 
pro-development faction won decisively. 
From then on, the chairmanship of the HYK has been held by leaders of 
the "Tsuen Wan faction" with few exceptions. Oppositions to the government 
could still be heard occasionally, especially from members of the old Yuen Long 
faction. In particular, Tang Tak-yuk, who retained his membership in the HYK 
after the reorganization and had been described by the government as “a trouble 
maker," formed an "Anti New Territories Land Policy Sub-Committee" within 
the HYK in 1960 to oppose the restrictions on the conversion of agricultural lands 
for building purposes." In 1962，the government also reported that there was a 
left-wing faction within the HYK, under the leadership of Kan Chung Hing (an 
ex-member of the left-wing Society of Plantations which had been dissolved by 
the government in 1959), which intended on developing friendly relations with 
other left-wing organizations." These isolated dissenting voices notwithstanding, 
the HYK was very cooperative with the state and the District Commissioner in 
particular. HYK's councillors and the Commissioner held regular meetings, 
exchanging views on development plans, land resumption, compensation schemes 
and land policies. Chan Yat-san, Chairman ofHYK in the 1970s from the "Tsuen 
Wan faction," summarized the HYK's responsibility in a speech: 
13 CO 1030/1333 "Heung Yee Kuk," pp. 18’ 22. Extracts from Hong Kong Police Special Branch 
Report. 
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It is the responsibility of the N. T. Heung Yee Kuk to protect the 
right of the N. T. people and their property. It is also its responsibility 
to ensure social harmony, political stability and economic prosperity 
in the N.T. Any councillor of the Kuk has the right to criticize the 
government on its mistakes and unfair measures but such criticism 
must be followed by constructive suggestions and a clear analysis of 
facts, and in the public interest (Chan 1981). 
As Chun (1987) noticed, after the 1950s voices of opposition to 
development projects were not heard in the HYK any more. What was most 
prominent instead were negotiations for material compensations. 
In this way, the colonizers successfully ruled out the danger of the HYK 
becoming a territory-wide base of resistance and cleared the way for more 
intensive development in the New Territories. Opposition to land resumption for 
development from villagers was then confined to specific local areas and was 
prevented from spilling over into the political area as the opposition to Tai Lam 
Chun reservoir had done. The local elite in the Rural Committees was backed up 
by the colonial state, and it monopolized access to political power. It had become 
virtually loyal helpers of the government facilitating land resumption and 
preventing rural protests. From the available historical evidence, Kuan and Lau，s 
characterization of the process as the "resuscitation" or "revival" of a declining 
rural leadership and institution is proved invalid. The divisions between the two 
camps were not between a stubborn conservative group waning in influence and 
legitimacy and a rising modernizing group. Both groups represented concrete 
14 CO 1030/1333 "Heung Yee Kuk," p. 31. Extracts from Monthly bitelligence Report. 
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material interests and communal bases. The government intervened steadfastly on 
the side of the pro-development group, a choice which was by no means an 
innocent "resuscitation." 
Though there are some forms of elections within the system - the election 
of village representatives, of Rural Committee chair, and of the HYK chair, and 
the rural elite always act in the name of the villagers' interests, the government 
has many ways to marginalize or even oust the non-compliant members. Most of 
the benefits the elite can offer to their constituents to win their hearts - from the 
important information on land development, meditation of disputes and other 
affairs between the villagers and the authority, to successful negotiations with the 
government on behalf of the villagers' interests, etc. - is based on concessions 
from the government. So the strategy of incentive dispensation is always effective 
in keeping the HYK under government's control, and in preventing the rural 
elite from resorting to means unacceptable to the authority - e.g. confrontational 
mobilization - to fight for their (and their constituents) rights. Ln other words, they 
depend heavily, and somehow exclusively, on the government's recognition and 
resources to build up their legitimacy over the villagers. 
Government support is the primary source of legitimacy for the HYK. In 
the case study, we will see an example in which the villagers kept electing the 
same person as their Village Representative, though they were highly critical of 
his performance, just because the current Headman was the one having the 
strongest ties with the government officials and other mral elite. 
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In this way, a hierarchy of colonial state-Heung Yee Kuk-Rural 
Committee-Village Representative is made as the base of colonial rule in the New 
Territories. At most time, the Heung Yee Kuk, Rural Committee and Village 
Representatives were in line with the colonial authority and have very good 
relation with it. When there were conflicts between them, they could usually be 
resolved through peaceful negotiation. Of course, there were exceptions as the 
colonial state-rural elite alliance was not an absolute stable one and involve 
strategic calculation on both sides. The exceptions had been especially frequent 
since mid-1980s when the rural elite was detaching from the colonizers and 
staying close to the Chinese government. Hence, the rural elite might not always 
help the government to forestall rural mobilization. They might suppress the 
mobilization, or they might be neutral to it. 
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The Existence ofAutonomous Organization 
The existence of an autonomous movement organization is important for 
mobilizing the protesters and sustaining the movement. However, the ‘autonomy’ 
of a movement organization should be further qualified before it can be used in 
analyzing the rural protest in Hong Kong. 
The autonomy of a movement organization can be characterized by its 
primary source of legitimacy. If it relies on the state as its source of legitimacy, it 
can hardly be an autonomous organization vis-a-vis the state. If not, it can be 
autonomous. The issue of organization autonomy will be discussed further in 
Chapter 6. 
In the socio-political context of the New Territories, the autonomous 
organizations capable of mobilizing protest actions may be Leftist organizations 
in the countryside and the Concem Groups for specific issues usually formed 
jointly by active villagers and social workers. Occasionally, the Heung Yee Kuk-
Rural Committee-Village Representative hierarchy would perform as an effective 
movement organization which tum against the colonial state and mobilize the 
villagers for confrontational action. Of course, it only happened in specific 
historical conjuncture when the alliance between the rural elite and the state was 
yet consolidated and the former had not been incorporated into the administration, 
(the cases before late 1950s) 
Of course, the absence of an autonomous organization might not imply 
there was not any organization among the villagers at all. Usually, it implies the 
unique presence of organizations which were not autonomous. The most obvious 
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example of such non-autonomous organization was the village office headed by 
the Village Headman. This category of organizations also included the co-
operatives organized by the government in the immigrant farmers community, 
and also the landsman associations whose leaders relied on the resources provided 
by the rural elite and the government. 
In the following section, I would trace the development of the major 
organizations in rural Hong Kong, no matter if they were autonomous or not. The 
Heung Yee Kuk can be regarded as an non-autonomous organization in the rural 
society. But I am not going to discuss it below as we have already seen how it was 
institutionalized and reconstituted in the 1950s. The government sponsored co-
operatives, left-wing organizations and social workers' NLCDP team was the 
most significant organizations present in the village communities besides, and 
they were the focus of the following discussion. 
Historical Development of Co-operative among the Immigrant Farmers 
After the Second World War, a large number of refugees migrated into 
Hong Kong from mainland China. Some of them went to the urban area, but some 
went to the New Territories to make a living by cultivating vegetables. They 
constituted a group of immigrant farmers who rented land from the indigenous 
villagers and resided on their agricultural land. They were socially excluded from 
the lineage village community and were politically excluded from the Heung Yee 
Kuk-Rural Committee-Village Representative hierarchy. The most important 
interface between the government and these immigrant communities is the 
agricultural cooperatives established in the immigrant communities under the 
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sponsor of Agriculture and Fisheries Department. These organizations played a 
quite important role in the economic and social life of the immigrants. 
Before we investigate the formation of cooperative organizations, we have 
to look into the formation of immigrant communities in the New Territories and 
the socio-economic change in the villages brought by the influx of immigrants 
and government's agricultural policy in the post-war years. 
(1) The post-war agricultural policy 
The outlook for the agrarian economy in the New Territories changed 
radically in the postwar years as a result of the surge in immigration. It is now 
common knowledge that most Chinese immigrants went to the urban area, but it is 
rarely noted that many of the refugees, once crossing the border, chose to stay in 
the New Territories and rented land from Hakka or punti landlords to become 
tenant farmers. The land which they rented was the fields left behind from 
outward migration by the original inhabitants to overseas and the city in the early 
postwar years. The origin of the immigrants was diverse. They might be urbanite, 
rice cultivators or vegetable farmers in the mainland (Aijmer 1973, 1975; Strauch 
1984). As vegetable growing became highly profitable with government support, 
most of these newcomers converted the rented paddy fields of the original 
inhabitants into vegetable gardens. They were regarded as the “immigrant 
. f a r m e r s " of the New Territories whose significance was always overlooked. 
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The government's postwar agricultural policy was to encourage the 
shifting from rice to vegetable production. An Agriculture Department was 
founded soon after the war.'^ Its mission was clearly stated: 
Prior to the war it was estimated that approximately one-fifth only of 
the vegetables consumed in the cities of Kowloon and Hong Kong 
was grown in the Territories. It has been the primary object of the 
Agriculture Department to increase this fraction very considerably 
(Hong Kong Annual Report 1947: 49). 
While this policy was largely economically motivated, the political background 
cannot be ignored.'^ Potter lists three factors contributing to the shift to vegetable 
production. In addition to the influx of immigrant farmers, are the following: 
Another factor was that the mainland was more isolated 
economically from the colony in the years after 1949，and this 
increased the need for the farmers of the New Territories to supply 
food for the expanding urban population. A third factor was the 
creation by the government of two marketing organizations [they will 
be mentioned later] that were designed to bring about the self-
sufficiency of the colony in foodstuffs by encouraging vegetable 
production (1968:59). 
Of course, the Colony, with scarce fertile farmland, could never achieve 
real self-sufficiency. The colonizers' concem was to minimize dependence on 
15 It was later reorganized into the Agricultural, Fisheries and Forestry Department in 1953. 
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mainland China, especially in the turbulent postwar years and after the founding 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In fact, since the early twentieth century, 
rice consumed by the expanding urban population was imported from Indo-China, 
Burma and Thailand {Hong Kong Annual Report 1949). On the contrary, 
vegetables and marine products were solely imported from China. The state's 
encouragement of local vegetable production was natural, if seen in this light. 
Eventually, the shifting of cultivation pattem had boosted the share of local 
vegetable production for local consumption from a negligible amount in the early 
twentieth century to nearly 50% in 1971 (Schiffer 1991:185)." 
The post-war agricultural policy also brought a great socio-economic 
impact on the villages. By renting their land to the immigrant farmers, the Hakka 
and Punti peasants could quit from agricultural production and became landlords 
themselves. To a certain extent, post-war New Territories were polarized into the 
immigrant farmers - their livelihoods were threatened most by land resumption 
and they were excluded from the HYK consultative structure - on the one side, 
and the privileged Hakka and Punti Communities on the other side. 
(2) The cooperatives 
The government intervened into the agrarian economy first by establishing 
a monopoly over the wholesaling of vegetable products in the Colony. The 
• Vegetable Marketing Organization (VMO) was formed in 1946. All vegetables 
16 Of course, it is difficult to distinguish "economic" reasons from "political" reasons, as the two 
are always intertwined. Hence, we are using the term "economic" in a very rough sense here. 
17 The share of fisheries production was increased to 85%. 
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produced in the New Territories or imported into Hong Kong were collected by 
the VMO's collecting points and then transported to the urban wholesale markets. 
In the 1950s, local vegetable marketing cooperatives were also organized 
extensively under the supervision of the Agriculture Department. Members and 
non-members were allowed to submit their vegetables to these local organizations, 
and a 10% commission was charged for the operating cost. Low interest credit 
and cheap fertilizers (nightsoil) were the principal benefits of membership.'® 
While the reception by the immigrant farmers of the cooperatives was by no 
means uniform, by 1962, over 76% of locally grown vegetables were handled 
through the cooperatives in contrast to 35% in 1952 [Hong Kong Annual Report 
7Pd5:118; 1952-M). The presence of "middlemen" in vegetable marketing and 
self-organized marketing associations among the farmers was gradually washed 
out (Tropley 1964:180-81). 
After the establishment of marketing cooperatives, a variety of 
cooperatives and voluntary associations were organized under state sponsorship 
one after the other. They included Pig-Raising Societies, Irrigation Societies, Co-
operative Building Societies, Fish Pond Societies and Credit and Consumers' 
Societies, etc., in each village. These societies performed a wide range of 
functions: sums of money were delivered to farmers after a bad harvest; loans 
‘ were given for the establishment of new vegetable farms or pig-raising enterprises; 
manpower was organized for small-scale public works from building a footpath to 
18 Loans were made from VMO Loan Fund, which provided credit, usually for periods of less than 
a year, at interest rates of 0.25% a month (compared with 10% from other sources). The 
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improving irrigation systems; experts were sent to the villages introducing new 
technology in agricultural production and providing technical advice; production 
competitions were held to stimulate agricultural production; money was raised for 
collective entertainment within the immigrant communities. 
Cooperatives supervised by the Agriculture and Fisheries Department 
therefore became an important part of the immigrant farmers' lives who were 
excluded from the village life of the original inhabitants." After the Second World 
War, then, a network of state-sponsored secondary organizations permeated the 
rural communities. It is therefore incorrect to say that the New Territories had 
become an atomized society due to socio-economic modernization. Communal 
solidarity might have been weakened, but the important point is that the spate of 
state-sponsored modem associations had attempted to fill the gap in village life. 
The organizations played a certain role in the formation of group identities 
among the immigrant farmers. Based on fieldwork in So Kun Wat, Chau and Lau 
noted that the election of the directors of the local cooperative was an important 
affair in the farmers' community live. Although the cooperative was not exclusive 
to immigrant farmers, it did facilitate the emergence of immigrant leaders and the 
formation of a Farming Association representing immigrants’ interests in the 
village. As most functions ofthe cooperatives depended on the resources from the 
Agricultural and Fisheries Department, the leaders usually maintained a good 
relationship with the government. Their legitimacy over the constituents was 
cooperatives also handled other governmental or non-governmental loan funds for the farmers, 
such as the Kadoorie Agricultural Loan Fund and the Joseph Trust Fund (Topley 1964:182). 
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more or less derived from this cordial relation. We will further discuss this point 
in the cases later. 
Historical Development of Left-Wing Forces in the New Territories 
Of course, government-sponsored societies were not the unique and 
always dominant form of communal identity and solidarity. Migdal (1974) 
suggests that farmers' communities in contemporary Third World were usually a 
contested terrain for different socio-political forces, such as nation state, left-wing 
parties and local interest groups, inside and outside the communities. As 
mentioned above, even the HYK had leftist elements during the 1960s. Aijmer 
(1980; 1986) also finds in Shatin that the immigrant farmers there did not form a 
homogeneous community. Different logic of communal identity and solidarity 
criss-crossed each other. Farmers of the same geographic origins tended to cluster 
and joined respective landsman associations. More importantly, PRC-affiliated 
left-wing organizations and Kuommg^awg-inclined organizations were present in 
the rural areas as well. Farmers were often divided in their political affiliations to 
either the Nationalists or the Communists. Aijmer discovers that it was common 
for immigrant farmers to hold a hostile attitude towards the colonial authority 
which was thought to take much from but give too little to the Chinese. Their 
perceived legitimacy of the colonial state was weak, making left-wing activists 
‘influential.^® The latter were so dominant that the leadership of the local marketing 
19 After examining the immigrant farmers' communities in Shatin, Aijmer finds that the Hakka 
villagers and the immigrant farmers were avoiding contact with each other. The farmers rarely 
resided in the village. Instead, they built huts at a comer of their farmland to live (Aijmer 1975). 
2° Aijmer was impressed by the "red-hot" political atmosphere in the area during the turbulent 
years of 1967-68. He saw a vegetable carrying lorry painted with the slogan “down with Soviet 
Imperialism!." He was also surprised to find that the farmland was surrounded by revolutionary 
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cooperative studied by Aijmer was monopolized by the leftists. In 1967, farmers 
were also mobilized by the cooperative leaders to protest against the authority's 
act of suppressing urban demonstrators. 
Though the existence of left-wing influence was not restricted to Shatin, it 
is wrong to exaggerate its influence.-' Rural leftists were scattered in a few 
communities and were not much organized into a unified political force (except in 
1967). They might be strong in some specific localities but were negligible at the 
level of the entire New Territories. Maybe it was caused by the weakness of 
territory-wide rural leftist organizations. A Hong Kong and Kowloon Chinese 
Farming and Agriculture Association was founded under strong left-wing 
leadership after the war to intervene into local disputes between immigrant 
tenants and indigenous landowners. Nevertheless, the organization was short-
lived and dissolved by the colonial regime in the early 1950s because of the 
political dangers posed by it (Aijmer 1986: 244-45; District Commissioner 
1951:6).22 
The overall weakness of left-wing forces and the dominance of 
government influence in the rural immigrant communities were exposed in 1967， 
when a series of strikes and riots broke out in the urban area. To prevent urban 
unrest from spreading into the New Territories, People Security Units were 
songs as the immigrant farmers listened to the Guangdong radio station when they were working 
in the field. 
21 Strauch (1984) notes a competition for local influence over immigrant farmers in a village in Tai 
Po between a leftist union and the cooperative. 
22 After 1967, some urban leftist went into the immigrant communities to rebuild their "second 
front" organizations. In the 1970s, leftist unions and farmers' associations based on rural 
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formed by local residents in all 28 administrative districts under the 
encouragement of the District Office after June. Local cooperatives and Rural 
Committees formed the backbone of these units. The first principle of these 
Security Units was to "support government's effort in keeping local public order" 
{Wah Kiu Yat Po 25 June 1967). They organized small teams to patrol the areas. 
Suspected leftists were apprehended and taken to the police. The units also 
conveyed government's messages and "correct information" back to the 
grassroots communities through Village Representatives and cooperatives. 
When the leftists called for a boycott of food markets and the Chinese 
government briefly stopped transporting agricultural products into the Colony, the 
authority reacted by rallying direct support from vegetable and pig-raising 
cooperatives. The response of the cooperatives was gratifying from the 
government's point of view. Their leaders sent letters to the authority promising 
they would try their best to guarantee the food supply {Wah Kiu Yat Po 30 June 
1967). The cooperatives redoubled their efforts in collecting agricultural products 
from their members. They seemed to have successfully forestalled any effort by 
the leftists to disrupt the vegetable supply in the New Territories. The head o f the 
Agriculture Department summoned the cooperatives' heads again on 28 July to 
express his gratitude: 
Today I invite you all to express my special thanks. In the recent 
turbulent months, you have given great support to the government 
personally or on behalf of agricultural organizations. And you all 
membership developed considerably. The Nung-muk chik-kung-ooi (The Graziers Union) 
mentioned by Strauch (1987) was one example. 
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have protected the peace and stability by concrete actions.... It is a 
fact that Hong Kong is not capable of producing all the necessary 
foodstuffs. But it is also a fact that Hong Kong has to maintain a 
strong and reliable agricultural sector to cope with any challenges 
from incidents when importation of outside products is disrupted. I 
am much confident in you agricultural leaders to continue 
shouldering this important responsibility in the coming days (Wah 
KiuYatPo29 Julyl967).^^ 
It is beyond doubt that the agricultural cooperatives were important stabilizing 
forces among the tenants communities in the eyes of the colonial state. Only after 
1967 did left-wing forces begin to step up their mobilizational efforts in the New 
Territories. We will retum to this later. 
The Social Worker and the NLCDP in the Countryside 
(1) The Voluntary Organizations in Hong Kong 
Social workers in Hong Kong usually refer to the organizers working for 
the voluntary associations. Most voluntary associations in Hong Kong were 
originally sponsored by Western religious groups and worked in the mainland 
China. Many of them moved to Hong Kong only after 1949 and provided services 
to the immigrant communities in the Colony. Over the 1950s, the overseas 
’ religious groups classified Hong Kong as an underdeveloped area in poverty. 
23 The stoppage of rice importation from China was not a serious problem as it was easily 
remedied by increasing the appropriation of rice stock from Southeast Asia, USA and Australia 
{Wah Kiu Yat Po 4 July 1967). 
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These voluntary organizations received a large amount of financial sponsorship 
from overseas. 
According to Chow (1995), a class of professional social workers sharing 
a more or less common ideology has emerged in the 1960s. Chow points out that 
this class of social workers was under the influence of Fabanism and were critical 
to the colonial social policy. In their eyes, reform on social welfare policy was 
necessary for narrowing the social inequality in Hong Kong. 
In the 1970s, the government increased their sponsorship on voluntary 
associations. At the same time, these associations received a decreasing amount of 
overseas sponsorships as the overseas religious no longer classified Hong Kong as 
an area of poverty. A survey found that between 1967/68 and 1973/74，the 
amount of sponsorship received by the 67 voluntary associations under the Hong 
Kong Council of Social Services from the government has risen from 10.6 to 41.8 
million Hong Kong dollars. By 1973/74，the percentage of overseas sponsorship 
in the association funding was 13.4%, while that of government sponsorship was 
46.6%. 
(2) Community action and social workers 
At the same time，some social workers, from voluntary associations with 
or without government sponsors, were increasingly inclined to the method of 
. 'community development' in their work. Through community development 
projects, resources are transferred to the target community from the social 
workers, and the residents were mobilized to concem different problems in their 
community and take action to solve them. According to Lui and Kung (1985), the 
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community development projects facilitated the flourishing of social actions 
among the grassroots communities over the 1970s by providing the skill, 
knowledge and external connections necessary for mobilization to the residents. 
(85-88) Society of Community Organization, Tsuen Wan Ecumenical Social 
Service Center and the Council on Public Housing were some important 
organizations committed to the method of community development. 
In 1978，a report on the pressure groups in Hong Kong was prepared by 
the government. The report suggested providing more financial support to the 
voluntary associations for their community development projects. According to 
the report, it is safer to let the voluntary associations, which was more reliable 
politically in the eyes of the government, to engage in community development 
project. It was also supposed to be a way of pre-empting the activities of other 
radical political forces in the community. At the same time, the programme on 
NLCDP OSfeighbourhood Level Community Development Project) was launched 
by the government to encourage, sponsor and supervise the community 
development projects of the voluntary organizations. 
From then on, most community development projects were sponsored and 
under the supervision by the government, though some organizations refused 
government sponsorship and thought that it was a mean of social control. The 
government sponsorship was also confined to the provision of services in the 
communities specified by the government. However, Wong (1989) argues that 
government sponsorship of community development projects did not guarantee 
that the social workers would utilize more moderate means which were acceptable 
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to the government. On the contrary, the social workers receiving the sponsorship 
of the government enjoyed quite a high level of autonomy. 
One example illustrating the autonomy of government sponsored NLCDP 
was the Tsuen Wan Ecumenical Social Service Center. From the 1970s, the social 
workers of this organization have been inclined to radical social action and their 
relation with government officials has been very tense. However, it has witness 
considerable development under the government sponsorship. Between 1970s to 
1980s，it had developed from an organization having one NLCDP team to an 
organization having four NLCDP teams, one community education center, one 
center for the aged and one dental clinic. (Tsuen Wan Ecumenical Social Service 
Center 1988) 
There are several reasons for the NLCDP autonomy despite government 
sponsorship. First，it was the Hong Kong Council of Social Service which held 
the actual process of allocating the government fund to the voluntary associations. 
The HKCSS was founded in 1958 long before the government sponsorship and 
some kind of ‘professional dignity ’ and quest for autonomy were said to have 
emerged among its members. (Wong 1989:51) The resources allocation within the 
HKCSS is of course not absolutely equalitarian. But it is processed through a 
coordination among different voluntary organizations and is based on the 
- evaluation of the organizations' capability of serving their clients according to 
some "professional standard." The clients' response (e.g. popularity) to the 
activities organized by the social workers is crucial to this evaluation. Any 
complaint from the clients could be a very sensitive issue for the organization. 
66 
Another reason is that though the high-ranking officials of the voluntary 
associations might be inclined to moderate strategy, the front-line social workers 
might not be influenced by this attitude. 
In addition, there exits an ideology of "professional dignity" among the 
social workers which urge them to maintain an image of independence from the 
government. It is especially so for the community development teams which aim 
their work at "empowering" the grassroots community to fight for their own right. 
They always try very hard to avoid the accusation that they are puppets of the 
government, and not working for the interests of the clients - no matter if the 
accusations come from other organizations in the fields or from their clients 
themselves. 
In 1996, the government proposed to cut the resources delivering to the 
NLCDP projects as a whole. Though the government justified the proposal by 
arguing that there were few communities of poverty left and hence the needs for 
NLCDP service was shrinking, it was widely believed - especially among the 
social workers themselves - that the real intention behind was to contain the 
recalcitrant NLCDP teams who always created "troubles" to the government 
officials by mobilizing protest actions. The social workers organized large scale 
protests in response. If the proposal was really motivated by dispensing the 
"troublemakers" from the government payrolls, it would be a strong evidence 
showing the autonomy of the NLCDP under the current mechanism of resource 
allocation. This shows that the government is incapable of containing the 
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community workers through this mechanism, and has to uproot the very existence 
of the teams to solve the problem. 
Simply speaking, though the government sponsorship of the NLCDP has 
induced some constraints to the works of the social workers in terms of the choice 
of target community, most NLCDP still retained a high level of autonomy in 
terms of strategies and styles of their work. 
(3) NLCDP in the rural area 
Most government sponsored NLCDP was in the urban area such as the 
communities of Temporary Housing Area and Public Housing Estate. 
Nevertheless, there are still 14 government sponsored NLCDP working in the 
countryside. 
The community development project was in fact more difficult to be 
implemented in the rural area than in the urban area. The obvious reason was the 
influence and conservative attitudes of the rural elite, and the close-knitted 
community structure of the lineage village. In fact, many social workers of rural 
NLCDP complained that they were always suspected by the rural elite and were 
always regarded as unreliable outsiders of the community. Provided with these 
difficulties, most rural NLCDP workers actually chose to serve the immigrant 
farmers (or former immigrant farmers still residing in the countryside) rather than 
the original inhabitants in the New Territories. 
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Chapter 4 
Conceptual Framework for Case Analysis 
Based on the above discussion, we can further qualify the two independent 
variables as follow. 
The Independent Variables 
The Presence orAbsence of Elite Suppression 
By elite suppression of the grassroots protest, I mean the action that the 
elite actively take to prevent the emergence of any collective action. There are 
many kinds of actions and tactics the elite can use to forestall villagers' 
mobilization, and are not restricted to directly oppressive means. For examples, 
buying off a mobilizing leaders and preempting the spontaneous mobilization 
among the villagers can be effective means as well. 
To recapitulate what we have discussed, the rural elite in Hong Kong has 
good reasons to suppress rural mobilization most of the time in the colonial period. 
One reason is that a "peaceful" environment in the village without collective 
actions is always a necessary condition for the functioning of the patron-client 
relation between the elite and the villagers, and the mechanism of "incentive 
dispensation". Hence, the elite tend to suppress the emergence of any protest 
politics which would weaken their hegemony in the village. Another reason for 
their propensity to forestall any mobilization is their role as a broker between the 
state and the villagers. As they rely on the resources from the authority to 
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maintain their positions in the rural society, they are expected, and are willing to 
perform well in keeping the rural stability for the state. 
From the description in the previous chapter, however, we see that in the 
one hundred years of colonial rule, the rural elite are not always in line with the 
colonial authority. Their alliance with the British did emerge out of some 
historical and conjunctural conditions. Actually, the rural leaders were one of the 
strongest anti-colonial forces in the territories before the 1956 HYK crisis. And 
after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984，the HYK leaders 
began leaning to the Chinese government and the colonial state-rural elite alliance 
eroded. 
Given the contingent nature of this alliance, we can expect that the elite's 
attitude towards the grassroots mobilization is not a constant. Through this, we 
can comprehend why rural stability is most guaranteed from 1956 and 1984， 
whereas the periods before and after witnessed higher frequency and larger scale 
of rural disturbances. Of course, the suspension of the rural elite - colonial 
authority alliance alone does not lead to the suspension of elite suppression. To 
tum the elite to a non-suppressive stand towards rural mobilization, another 
condition has to be fulfilled: the mobilization would not challenge their hegemony 
in the village, and would not harm their interests. Whatever the reasons behind 
elite suppression and non-suppression are, we can divide the independent variable 
of elite suppression into two attributes: presence or absence. 
In many immigrant farmers communities which are detached from the 
communities and power structure of the original inhabitants, there also exists a 
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strata of rural elite whose role is analogous to the HYK elite. They usually emerge 
from the government-organized cooperatives. Similarly, I hypothesize that the 
suppression or non-suppression of these elite is a variable determining the 
formation of protest among the immigrant farmers. 
Autonomous Mobilizing Organization: Absence or Presence 
As most protest actions under scrutiny are protests targeting at the state, 
the mobilizing organization's autonomy vis-a-vis the state is taken as the single 
most important dimension of organization autonomy. 
In the previous chapter, we can see there are many different organizations 
in the rural areas - HYK, cooperatives, leftist organizations, and social workers 
team, etc. However, they can be categorized into two major groups: organizations 
autonomous from the state, and those not autonomous from the state. This clear-
cut classification can be made by judging the primary source of legitimacy of 
each organization. Of course, theoretically there can be an organization which has 
multiple sources of legitimacy so that it is difficult for us to pin-point a single 
primary source of legitimacy. But in the case of rural Hong Kong, such 
organization does not exist. All actually existing rural organizations derive their 
legitimacy primarily from either the government or some other sources. 
In addition, in the rural setting in Hong Kong, the absence of autonomous 
, organization naturally implies the presence of non-autonomous organization, as 
the HYK - Rural Committee - Village Representative system, or farmers 
cooperatives - as non-autonomous organizations - does penetrates into all comers 
of the village society. It is hardly to find a case in which there is no organization 
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at all in a rural community. Hence the "presence of non-autonomous 
organization" is taken as a constant background, no matter ifthere is autonomous 
organization or not. 
On the side of non-autonomous organizations we can fmd the HYK -
Rural Committees - village office hierarchy as a distinct organization, and the 
rural cooperatives. Ever since the high-hand dissolution and reconstitution of the 
then recalcitrant HYK by the government in 1956, the rural elite organization has 
been integrated into the colonial administration. The territory-wide HYK, and 
regional Rural Committees and Village Offices have developed stable, 
institutional connection with the central and local bureaucracy of the government 
respectively. In other words, different levels o fHYKhave been transformed into 
the consultative bodies of the government at different administrative levels. The 
establishment of the chain of incentive dispensation along the government - HYK 
-Rural Committee Chairs - Village headman - villagers hierarchy converted the 
HYK from a bottom up to a top down organization - with the colonial authority at 
the commanding height. Subsequently their source of legitimacy shifted from the 
villagers to the colonial authority. Under this structure, being got into a career of 
rural elite was more a matter of tapping more material interests than a matter of 
winning villagers' respect; and the recognition from above become more 
important than the recognition from below, (cf. Kuan and Lau 1979) 
Though the relation between the rural elite and the British authority turns 
into more antagonistic after 1985, when the former began to affiliate themselves 
with the Beijing authority, it does not mean that the HYK system has gained more 
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autonomy from the state. Institutionally, it is still part of the administration. And 
this institutional relation with the government is not likely to be changed after the 
sovereignty handover. 
Similarly, the cooperatives exists extensively in the rural area was not 
autonomous from the state. They relied heavily on the financial and technical 
support, as well as information from the government. The primary source of 
legitimacy of the leaders were their role as the mediator between the immigrant 
farmers and the government, which was in tum based on the recognition by the 
government officials. Though these organizations could never catch up with HYK 
in terms oftheir access to the policy making process, both at the central and local 
level of the colonial administration, their relation with the grassroots villagers on 
the one hand and the state of the other was analogical to the situation o f the HYK 
system - incentive dispensation and institutionalized negotiation were the rules of 
the game. The cooperatives leaders' dependence on the government for 
legitimacy was shown clearly be the fact that after 1980 when the government 
began withdrawing its support of agriculture and hence the agricultural 
cooperatives, the strata of pro-government elite among the immigrant farmers 
declined and the cooperatives fell into the hand of the militant left-wing unionists 
one after the other. (Chiu and Hung 1997:48) 
On the other side, the leftist organizations and NLCDP in the village were 
autonomous from the state in their daily operation. Their source oflegitimacy was 
independent from the government, as we have seen in the previous chapter. 
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At last, as the HYK structure and the cooperatives are integrated into the 
government administration and are non-autonomous, it is natural that any 
organization autonomous from the state is simultaneously autonomous from both 
the system of HYK and the cooperatives. Logically and empirically, the 
autonomy vis-a-vis the state always implies autonomy vis-a-vis the organizations 
which are non-autonomous from the state. 
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Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Analysis 
In summary, the two variables determining the formation of social protest 
are the "presence/absence of elite suppression" on the one hand, and the 
"absence/presence of mobilizing organization autonomous from the state" on the 
other. While the former is a strategic variable depending on the action of the 
agents (rural elite can choose either suppress or not suppress the mobilization), 
the latter is an institutional variable depending on the source of legitimacy of the 
organization concerned. The source of legitimacy of an organization is in tum 
determined by the trajectory of the historical development of that organization, 
and the relation of that organization with the government, its constituents or other 
social groups. 
Putting the analysis of the two independent variables together, the 
following table is constructed for the comparative analysis. 




Absence 1. Chan Wai Mobilization against the Land 
2. So Kun Wat Inheritance Legislation 
Organization 
Autonomous  
from the State 
Presence 1. ShunWai Protest against Waste 
2. Hung Wan Disposal Legislation 
Six cases are fitted into four groups corresponding to different 
combinations ofthe independent variables. 
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Moreover, the four groups can be measured in terms of the intensity of the 
protest. The intensity of the protest, as an dependent variable, is of course 
opposite to the concept of "rural stability" as discussed by Kuan and Lau (1978), 
among the others. However, the concept of "intensity of protest" here is not as 
general and abstract as "rural stability". In fact, the concept can be broken up into 
two dimensions of measurement. 
The first dimension is the number of participants in the protest, given that 
there is a conflict between the government and the villagers. Of course, the more 
the number of participants, the more intense the protest. More, as the number of 
villagers affected by the conflict (or the number of potential participants) varies 
from case to case, the absolute number of participant in each case is incomparable 
with other cases. Hence, a relative number - the number of participants / the 
number of potential participants - is taken instead as a measurement. 
The second dimension is the strategies adopted by the protest participants. 
It is very natural to use the degree of confrontation in the protest as a 
measurement of this dimension of protest intensity. Unlike the rate of 
participation which is a numerical measurement, the strategy adopted can be 
measured nominally. Basically, we can classify every single protest action into 
confrontational one or non-confrontational one. Confrontational action included 
demonstration, sit-in, rally, etc. And the most prominent form of non-
confrontational action is institutionalized negotiation between the two parties in 
conflict. Of course, confrontational approach means higher protest intensity than 
non-confrontational one. 
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Though a protest movement can be composed of two kinds of protest 
actions simultaneously, we can always tell if the actors are inclined to 
confrontational action or institutionalized negotiation as the primary mean of 
pushing their appeals. For an example, a protest group would use the chance of 
negotiation to show that the authority is not going to concede and hence to justify 
their confrontational action; or alternatively, the group could see the 
confrontational action as a show off of power in order to increase their bargaining 
power in the negotiation with the authority. Though confrontational and 
negotiation approaches were combined in both case, the cases are obviously very 
different in terms of their overall orientation. In other words, the primary 
approach of actions can always be identified in a given protest movement. 
It is undeniable that within the general category of confrontational action 
(or non-confrontational action), there can be actions of different confrontational 
action (e.g. from demonstration to violence conflict; or from harmonious 
discussion to untrustworthy bargaining to threaten each other on the negotiation 
table). But such sub-level of confrontation is usually determined by contingent 
factors such as strategic and tactical calculation of the movement leaders, or the 
public response to their previous action as perceived by the participants, etc.. This 
could change from time to time in a given movement and are beyond the scope of 
my study. Hence a dichotomous "confrontational" and "non-confrontational" 
measurement with regard to the overall orientation of the movement is used. 
In the following parts, each group of the cases will be investigated in 
detail to find out how specific outcomes ofprotest intensity would be produced by 
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different combination of the independent variables. Sure, all cases are chosen on a 
criteria that there is already conflict of interests between the community under 
scrutiny and the government, (or other related institutions) That is，only 
communities with issues inductive to collective protest are chosen. 
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Chapter 5 Extreme Cases 
Extreme Cases 1: Presence of Elite Suppression and Absence of Autonomous 
Organization 
The Case of Chan WaP 
(1) The case 
As the absence of autonomous organization and strong suppression of the 
rural elite always results in an absence of mobilization and protest action, it is 
highly difficult to spot the case fitting into these categories. However, the reaction 
of the Chan Wai villagers to the construction of high voltage pylon can well 
illustrate this. 
Chan Wai is an indigenous village in the vicinity of Hung Wan village 
which will be discussed later. In 1994，villagers in the area discovered that the 
power company was going to construct a number of pylons there and let the high 
voltage power line over the densely populated residential area. The villagers in 
Chan Wai and Hung Wan worried about the hazards of the high voltage power 
lines. But the reaction of the Chan Wai villagers were in sharp contrast with that 
of Hung Wan villagers who formed a Concem Group with an NLCDP in the 
village and fought against the construction project. 
There was not any mobilization against the power company construction 
in the village. But in one occasion, several villagers contacted the Concem Group 
24 The case study is based on my participant observation of the protest action of Hung Wan 
villagers between August 1994 and February 1995. All the names mentioned are faked for the 
protection of the subject. 
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in Hung Wan to told them they supported their action very much and would like 
to join any protest action launched by the Group. But they emphasized that they 
did not want to let their villagers know about their presence in the protest action, 
as they thought that the Village Headman detested the Concem Group very much. 
According to the Chan Wai villagers, their Village Representative accused the 
Concem Group ofbringing chaos to the village life in the area. They also said that 
the Village Headman had received bribes from the power company so that he was 
very negative to any voices against the construction project. According to these 
informants, discontent and fear of the pylon were widespread, and many villagers 
supported what the Concem Group was doing and hoped it could win. 
Their fear of their village leaders could be also illustrated by the fact that 
when I asked them for a formal interview, they declined so absolutely and said 
that they were afraid of any kind of exposure. These few villagers joined several 
protest actions of the Concem Group, but were not very active through the end. It 
is a case showing the non-occurrence of protest action under the condition of elite 
suppression in the village and absence of autonomous organization. 
(2) Analysis 
Of course, the case is inadequate in showing how exactly the elite 
suppression combined with the absence of autonomous organization to produce 
the non-protest result, provided that there was not any opportunity for me to do 
ethnographic research in the village. However, insights can be derived from my 
interview with a social worker who has rich experiences in dealing with the rural 
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elite in Shun Wai, a village of original inhabitants which would be investigated in 
further detail later. 
According to my informant, in such a traditional village as Shun Wai, the 
villagers knew each other and all villagers had to deal with the government 
through the village head. So everybody had to respect and be afraid of the him. It 
was easy for the village leader to marginalize anybody he disliked. Apart from the 
his monopoly access to the government officials (cf. "incentive dispensation"), 
another powerful weapon of the village elite was gossips. Personal attacks (e.g. 
saying that somebody was a troublemaker and untrustworthy) and rumours (e.g. 
somebody was bribed by some outsiders) could easily be spread in the village 
community, and was especially so by the village leaders provided with their 
extensive personal networks and the fact that many villagers were willing to serve 
him by spreading the messages. 
What the social workers described was the situation of a village in which 
there was a social workers team as an alternative locus of social network among 
the villagers, though he believed that it was not particular phenomenon in a 
particular village, but was rather a general phenonomon in the rural society of 
Hong Kong. The situation of Chan Wai, which had no other social organization 
other than the village office, must be much worse. The patron-client relation 
between the village head and his fellow villagers was in fact a kind of social 
control preventing any outbreak of protest action in advance. Hence, in the Chan 
Wai case, the presence of elite suppression excluded the possibility of 
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mobilization for confrontation action and the participation rate of the villagers is 
needless to say zero. 
/ 
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The Case ofSo Kun Wat 
So Kun Wat village is a Hakka village between Tsuen Wan and Tuen Mun. 
Since the 1950s, an increasing number of immigrants had moved into the village 
and become tenants of the Hakka landlords. Chau and Lau (1982) have 
documented the formation of community identity and emergence of community 
leaders among the immigrants under the mediation of the colonial state, and how 
these elite channeled the resolution of conflicts between the immigrant farmers 
and government into institutionalized negotiation. 
(1) The Setting 
So Kun Wat was a Hakka village with a large population of immigrant 
farmers. By the late 1970s, So Kun Wat had a total population of 5,500 with about 
560 households. 125 households were Hakka families while 435 were immigrant 
families. 
The Hakka community was made up of three lineages, the Lee, Chan and 
Cheng. The Lee was the largest lineage, while the Cheng was the smallest one. In 
the late 1940s, the system of Village Representative established in the village. 
Two representatives were elected in each tum of election. In the village, one 
representative was from the Lee lineage and one from Chan. The Cheng villagers 
were supposed to be represented by the other two lineage’ representatives. 
Moreover, as the Lee lineage was larger than the Chan lineage, the representative 
from the Chan lineage was regarded as vice-representative while the one from Lee 
lineage is the formal leader of the three lineages. 
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Since the early 1950s, increasing number of immigrants had settled in So 
Kun Wat and rented land from the Hakka landlords. Some of them also started 
cultivating on the fallow land which belonged to the government. The immigrant 
farmers lived in a cluster of rural squatters and was socially segregated from the 
Hakka community. The vegetables they produced were sold to the market through 
the middlemen who were merchants in the town. So the immigrants were 
economically independent from the Hakka. However, they always needed to ask 
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the Hakka Village Representative for help. Their newly cultivated plots of land 
had to be registered with the District Office through the Village Headman before 
a permit of use could be issued. The Village Representative was also granted the 
authority of proving the identity of the outsiders. The immigrants had to ask the 
government through the representatives for a permit before they could build of 
rural squatters. The immigrants' livelihoods depended much on the Hakka village 
elite. 
At many times, the immigrants got into confrontation with the Hakka 
villagers. Occasionally, the cows and buffaloes of the rice-cultivating original 
inhabitants would broke into the vegetable field of the immigrants to eat the 
vegetable there. These incidents always provoked quarrels between the owner of 
the animal and the immigrant farmers, and fighting would ensue sometimes. 
Feuds involving whole lineage of the original inhabitants and large numbers of 
immigrants broke out occasionally. Usually, the quarrels were arbitrated by the 
Village Representative. 
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Though the immigrants were not regarded as part of the Hakka community, 
they did live under the patron-client network of the Hakka elite. 
(2) The cooperatives and the Farming Association 
The situation changed when a vegetable marketing cooperative society 
was founded in 1957. Vegetable growers, including immigrant farmers and Hakka 
villagers still engaged in agriculture, joined the cooperatives. However, the 
immigrant members outnumbered the Hakka members. In the first year of its 
establishment, the total membership was 86，with 20 original inhabitants and 66 
immigrant farmers. By the 1960s, the cooperative has grown to a membership of 
210，of which only two-fifths were original inhabitants. It was observed that the 
cooperative played an important role in the social life of the villagers as the 
election of its directors had become an important event in the community, more 
than 85% of the members would attend the election and even non-members would 
attend to share the excitement. (Chau and Lau 1982:142) 
In the five members broad of directors, only one or two original 
inhabitants would be elected and the chairman and vice-chairman of the broad 
were always immigrant farmers. The cooperative performed many economic 
functions in the community. It picked up vegetable from the farmers and 
commissioned a service charge far lower than that of the middlemen. It also 
deducted a few percentage ofprofit to accumulate into a sum of capital which was 
then used for local welfare programmes and low interest loan programme. The 
welfare programmes included helping the victims of disasters in economic terms. 
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As the cooperative was under the supervision of Agriculture and Fishery 
Department and not the District Office, it could not replace the role of the Village 
Representative as the intermediary between the immigrants and the government. 
However, it did facilitate the emergence of informal leaders among the immigrant 
communities. With the emergence of local leaders, the immigrants became less 
dependent on the Village Representative in many occasions such as the arbitration 
of disputes between themselves and the original inhabitants. The influence of the 
original inhabitants leaders over the immigrant community was declining. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the transformation of socio-economic 
situation led to the establishment of an immigrant community organization. From 
the late 1960s, more and more original inhabitants went to the urban area to find 
jobs. They were willing to sell their land to the government or outsider developers 
and quit farming as they thought that farming was an inferior occupation. On the 
contrary, the immigrant farmers did not have such discrimination against farming 
as an occupation, and was more eager to invest in upgrading their agricultural 
technology. The willingness of the Hakka landlords to sell their farmland and the 
unwillingness of the immigrant farmers to quit farming generated many conflicts 
between the two groups. The Village Representative inevitably sided with the 
Hakka villagers in such kind of conflicts. The immigrant farmers increasingly 
thought that the Village Headman was unreliable in arbitrating the conflicts and 
asked for leaders of their own to negotiate with the villagers. 
Under such background, a Farming Association was established in 1970 in 
So Kun Wat. It was an exclusive immigrant farmers organization and its leaders 
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were the leaders of the cooperatives. The organization was registered under the 
Registrar of Societies. It was regarded by the government officials as a 
representative body of the So Kun Wat immigrants. 
The services offered by the Association included the transportation of 
farmers' products to the vegetable market, the operation of a clinic and a 
kindergarten, the organization of tours to foreign cities, the provision of relief to 
the families of deceased members, the arrangement of funeral services, and 
assisting the Agriculture and Fisheries Department in the administration of 
government services. The association was in fact a spin-off from the cooperative. 
Whereas the organization ‘serves to foster a sense of mutual identification among 
the outsiders [the immigrant farmers] and to enhance their internal solidarity,' 
(144) the legitimacy of its leaders depended on how well they did in helping the 
immigrants to deal with the outsider, which in tum depended on the leaders' 
harmonious relation with the local government administration. It is why the 
Association never broke up with the officials in the Agriculture Department and 
District Offices. The leaders of the Farming Association became the "village 
representative" of the immigrant community. 
The Association developed fast and by 1973, it managed to build an office 
and members' club at the outskirts of the village. The immigrant community has 
got rid of the influence of the Hakka leaders and obtained full independence in 
most issues. 
(3) The issue 
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In the mid-1970s, the government began to appropriate large amount of 
land from So Kun Wat for the construction of a highway. Negotiations between 
District Officers and the Village Representative began. The government offered 
handsome compensation for the Hakka landlords but only little compensation for 
the immigrant tenants. Grievances accumulated among the immigrants. They 
thought that the government and the original habitants were cooperating with each 
other to make large profit from the development while their interests was 
neglected. 
The anger of the immigrants did not accumulate for long before the 
leaders of the Farming Association, with the support of the government officials, 
stepped in to act as the representative of the immigrants and negotiate with the 
government. It was the only agent the government was willing to deal with on the 
land resumption issue. The immigrants had no choice other than letting their 
representatives to convey their voices to the bargaining table. According to Kuan 
and Lau (1978), the representative dealing with the government on the land 
resumption issues would always be granted additional resources and benefits by 
the government if they performed well - that is, if they remained cooperative and 
help forestalling any resistance to the resumption. So the elite would never be 
interested in allowing any mobilization politics. It is hardly believable that the So 
Kun Wat case was an exception. After their ethnographic observation of the case, 
Chau and Lau concluded that the Farming Association had successfully prevented 
an outbreak of any protest action and channeled the farmers' grievances to an 
"institutionalized resolution of conflict". 
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Chau and Lau has not mentioned how the resumption problem in So Kun 
Wat was resolved at last. However, no single protest action had been recorded in 
So Kun Wat in the period. This suggests that the issue was settled down 
peacefully at last. 
(4) Analysis 
The role of the Farming Association in forestalling an outbreak of 
confrontation between the farmers and the government was clear. By taking the 
issue into its hand, it preempted any independent efforts among the villagers to be 
mobilized. Though the Association's efforts in preempting the occurrence of 
protest action might not involve the use of physical power (e.g. high-handed break 
up of would-be protest actions as shown in the case of Shun Wai discussed later), 
the efforts were anyway an effective means in suppressing (the possibility of) 
grassroots mobilization. 
Chau and Lau interpreted the event as an example of how the government 
co-opted the leaders of a local community to bring forth an "institutionalized 
resolution of conflicts". But their perception of the Farming Association as an 
autonomous organization before the land resumption and was only co-opted later 
on was wrong. The Farming Association, which got its legitimacy by the financial 
and technical support from the government and its good relation with the officials, 
was not autonomous from the outset. Its reliance on the strategy of 
institutionalized negotiation was determined by its long-lasting working relation 
with the government, and its being a local agent of the government administration 
in delivering various resources to the villagers. 
89 
It is a case showing how a potential protest action was channeled to 
institutionalized negotiation between a few elite and the government by the 
preemptive action of the elite and the absence of an autonomous organization. No 
protest of any kind was resulted. 
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Extreme Case II: Absence of Elite Suppression and Presence of Autonomous 
Organization 
The Case of Protest against Waste Disposal Regulation'^ 
The protracted resistance against Waste Disposal Regulation among the 
livestock farmers was unprecedented in the Colony in terms of its scale, 
persistence and violence. It involved thousands of farmers from all comers of the 
New Territories and several large scale collective violence was triggered between 
1987 to 1994. 
(1) The setting 
In the late 1980s, the organizational and political structure of the New 
Territories was radically different from the 1970s. After the urban expansion in 
the 1970s, most agricultural lands formerly farmed by original inhabitant or 
immigrant farmers have been appropriated by development projects. Many 
farmers, however, have chosen not to migrate to the urban area and have started to 
raise livestock such as pigs, chickens and pigeons in very limited rural space left 
in the New Territories. Most of the livestock produced were sold to the thriving 
restaurants in Hong Kong. However, the farmers' livelihoods were threatened 
when the government tried to implement a Waste Disposal Regulation in 1987. 
(2) The cooperatives, the Heung Yee Kuk and the Leftist Union 
After the 1967 failure in instigating an urban riot, the organizational 
strength of left-wing organizations, symbolized by its trade union arm, increased 
“The case study is based on the materials gathered from the newspaper clippings on the issue. 
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dramatically in the rural area. It was apparently successful in capitalizing on the 
stock of grievances among the immigrant farmers and has organized them. The 
leftists in the countryside were active in intervening in the land disputes arising 
from land resumption and stood on the side of the immigrant farmers. 
The Hong Kong Graciers Union, the major leftist organization among the 
immigrant farmers, has witnessed rapid development between 1967 to 1981，even 
though the percentage of population engaged in agriculture has been declining, ln 
1968，the total number of members of the Union was 115. In 1971，it has risen to 
3639. In 1981，its membership reached an apex of 22655. (Registrar of Trade 
Unions 1969，1972，1982) With the declining technical and financial support of 
the agriculture by the government, and hence the decrease in cooperatives' 
reliance on the government officials, many rural cooperatives have been taken 
over by the leftist union. 
The overall political dynamics the New Territories has also changed as 
the HYK and the rural elite have begun to dissociate themselves from the British 
colonial administration after the signing of the Sino-British Declaration. The rural 
elite, or at least a sizable number, has tumed itself from a staunch supporter of the 
colonial administration into "patriots" supporting the restoration of Chinese 
sovereignty and against British "conspiracies" over Hong Kong. This political 
realignment in the rural area is naturally conducive to protest against the colonial 
government, and also made them less repressive against leftist activism in the 
farmers community. We can expect that the post 1986 HYK elite were no longer 
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an agent of the British colonizers in keeping out rural collective actions, unless 
they perceived the actions might do harm to their own authority. 
(3) The issue 
The Waste Disposal Regulation was firstly drafted in 1985. Under the 
Regulation, livestock raising in the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and parts of the 
New Territories would be forbidden. The remaining livestock raisers in the New 
Territories would have to be placed under a very strict standard restricting waste 
disposal. Licenses were issued to farmers who were within the maximum level 
allowed. However, the licenses would be canceled if the farmers were found 
disposing of waste at a level higher than the standard and a fine would be 
imposed. 
The bill stirred up the farmers as it would destroy their livelihoods. They 
also felt that the government should give them financial and technical assistance 
to upgrade their facilities in order to meet the standard. Farmers' organizations, 
including left-wing farmers' unions and pig-raising cooperatives, joined together 
to form an alliance called the Joint Conference of Agricultural Associations. The 
alliance was dominated by left-wing groups. 
The alliance took an uncompromising stand against the Regulation at the 
beginning, and threatened violent action if the bill was passed (fVah Kiu Yat Po 
26 February 1987). On October 9，1987, a rally was organized and was joined by 
more than 2,000 farmers. In the rally, farmers spoke furiously against the 
Regulation, and a declaration was made: "We farmers will protect our livelihoods 
with our own lives, we will live and die with our farms” {Wen Wei Po 9 October 
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1987). At the same occasion, the Chairman of the HYK, Lau Wong Fat, made a 
speech to show his support of the farmers' action. But he also told the angry 
peasants not to resort to violent action. He said that only the principles of the 
Regulation would be passed in the coming Legislative Council (LegCo) meeting, 
but its details would be determined later by the government in consultation with 
the HYK. The HYK would reflect their views to the officials. 
The farmers did not follow the advice of Chairman Lau. On 15 October, 
more than a thousand farmers gathered outside the LegCo building. They 
attempted to stop the LegCo meeting by rushing into the building and eventually 
clashed with the police. The farmers hassled the police for seven hours. One of 
them was injured on his head while another one was arrested. The bill passed 
almost unanimously, except for the opposition of a representative from the left-
wing Federation of Trade Unions. After this, a consultation committee composed 
of farmers' organizations and the officials was formed to discuss details of the 
Regulation. But, the discussion in the meetings was not very amicable as the 
farmers' representatives protested by walking out nearly every time and 
complained that officials were indifferent to their demands. 
In the following years, demonstrations were organized frequently outside 
government buildings. Each demonstration involved at least several hundred 
farmers, and clashes with the police were common. On 27 April 1994，about 
1,000 farmers from all comers of the New Territories gathered at the LegCo 
building again when the Regulation was finalized. This time, the demonstrators 
were more prepared. Trucks of chickens and ducks were transplanted to the Hong 
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Kong Island and set free onto the busy roads in Central to paralyze the traffic. The 
farmers armed themselves with nightsoil, wooden sticks and litter bins and 
assaulted the police who kept them away from the building. Actually the number 
ofprotest participation were much more than 1,000. In Yuen Long, trucks taking 
more than three hundreds farmers which gathered in a parking lot with their 
"weapons" were intercepted by the police when they were about to head on to 
Central. It resulted in a physical conflict between the police and the protesters 
(JVah Kiu Yat Po 28 April 1994). Nevertheless, the farmers' action could not stop 
the legislators from passing the law, and the leader of the alliance claimed that 
they would continue the opposition to the Regulation through radical actions in 
spite of their temporary defeat. 
(4) Analysis 
This case clearly shows how the farmers were mobilized into a territory-
wide protest. The protest intensity was very high. The participation rate was more 
than 10% at most (2,000 protesters / less than 26,000 livestock farmers in Hong 
Kong)26, confrontational approach was adopted over the ten years of protest. The 
protest group also showed no tendency to go to the bargaining table at all. 
The importance of autonomous movement organization (the Joint 
Conference of Agricultural Associations) was obvious in this case. The JCAA, 
which was dominated by the ever anti-colonial and pro-PRC left wingers, did not 
have any intention of pleasing the government and had no "harmonious relation” 
26 There is no accurate estimation of the total number of people in the livestock industry at the time 
of the protest. But the by-census data for 1986 shows that there are 23,131 people in the 
agricultural occupation altogether, including all farmers in livestock raising and vegetable 
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with the authority to maintain. Naturally, they felt free to launch radical actions 
which fitted the emotion of the farmers best. The JCAA representatives found it 
difficult to trust the government and hence did not have any reason to believe that 
negotiation could solve the problem. They threatened violent direct action at the 
very beginning. The threat was realized and any government's attempt to initiate 
peaceful negotiation ended up in walk-out protest of the farmers' representatives. 
Moreover, JCAA's mistrust of the government and reluctance to go onto 
the negotiation table, and its inclination to confrontation action can also be 
comprehended in terms of the fact that the leftist farmer organizations had 
developed in the colony independent of government co-optation and had ever ‘ 
been competing with the government sponsored cooperatives, (as seen in the 
chapter 3) For the leftist organizations, the principal problem they faced when 
establishing themselves in the rural community was how to win the heart of the 
villagers, as they have to rely primarily on their clients or constituents for 
legitimacy. It was somehow a competition with the rural elite for the villagers， 
support. To justify their presence, they had to persuade the villagers they could 
provide them something the elite cannot provide. If they were to intervene into 
any conflict between the villagers and the government, it did not make sense for 
them to choose an institutionalized negotiation approach, as the rural leaders 
having good relation with the government officials would definitely do better than 
them. The choice left for them was confrontational action. Researches shows that 
many leftist organizations in the rural area did develop their membership by 
gardening etc.. Hence the number of livestock farmers in Hong Kong by 1987 must be much 
lesser than 26,000. 
96 
fighting for the rights of the tenant farmers against the landlord, (e.g. Strauch 
1984) This situation made the leftist rural groups got used to confrontational and 
non-compromising approach of conflict resolution.，？ This explains why the JACC 
refused to negotiate with the government even though the door of negotiation was 
wide open at the very beginning. 
HYK showed their support to the angry farmers. The support and presence 
of the HYK chairman in the farmers rally, were important, for it might at least let 
the farmers in different villages feel free to join the action, without the fear of the 
deterrence from the rural elite. Though the HYK leader's verbal support of the 
farmers never materialized (Chairman Lau even did not vote against the Bill in 
the LegCo), and he did advise the farmer not getting to radical action, he did 
never try to forestall the violent confrontation and massive mobilization among 
the farmers. In addition, the rural elite in the immigrant communities emerged 
with the cooperative did not play any significant role in the issue, as they nearly 
disappeared after the government retreated its support of farmers' organization. 
But though the HYK and the leftist JCAA were in the same line in this 
case, we can still observe their divergence in approaching the issue. In contrast 
with the JCAA's confrontational orientation, HYK, as an organization long been 
integrated with the government administration (and the legislative body as well, 
after the government gave a seat to a HYK in the LegCo in the 1980s), was 
inclined to more institutional means of conflict resolution, though it never 
27 The casual relation between autonomous organizations (leftist group's and NLCDP's as we will 
see later) and confrontational orientation is only valid in a rural setting, provided with their need to 
compete with the influential community leaders coopted by the authorities. It might not be true in 
an urban setting, 
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attempted to suppress the mobilization of the angry formers. It was reflected by 
Lau Wong Fat's attempt to persuade the angry farmer that the issue could be 
settled in the consultative body set up by the government. 
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Chapter 6 Intermediate Cases 
Intermediate Cases I: Absence of Elite Suppression and Absence of 
Autonomous Organization 
The Case of Mobilization against Land Inheritance Legislation 
(1) The issue 
The controversy was sparkled in 1994 when the government supported a 
Land Inheritance Legislation under the principle of "equal opportunities，，as 
proposed by an independent LegCo member, Christin Loh. The Legislation was to 
outlaw the practice of the original habitants that their male descendants would be 
the exclusive inheritors of their land property when they passed away. It was 
supposed to be a traditional practice existed for hundreds of year before the 
British came. The colonizers allowed the continuation of these traditions under 
the promise of "protecting the traditional rights and customs of the original 
inhabitants" after 1899. Like the case of the anti-Waste Disposal regulation, the 
rural elite did not behave as an agent for the colonial authority to forestall rural 
mobilization. Further, the elite themselves became the agitators of protests as they 
perceived the government action offended their legitimate rights. 
When the Bill was firstly proposed in the February of 1994，the HYK 
reaction was mild. An ad hoc group was formed within the HYK to study the 
details of the Legislation and gave comments on related issues through the media. 
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The rural elite attacked the Legislation as a violation of their traditional rights 
enjoyed for centuries. {Ming Pao 23 Feb. 1994) 
On March 1994，the government suddenly declared it would support the 
Christine Lok by help pushing the Legislation. This irritated the rural leaders. On 
March 13 a press conference was held by HYK. Chairman Lau Wong Fat accused 
the Hong Kong - British government of betraying the New Territories original 
inhabitants. He told the media that many rural leaders were planing protest actions, 
and the scale of protest would not be smaller than those in the 1987 upheavals 
against the Waste Disposal Regulation. He also warned that a number of 
individual members of HYK purported to rage radical action, though they were 
temporarily contained by the moderate majority who though that the issue should 
be further studied before any concrete action could be confirmed. However, it was 
reported that Chairman Lau had been receiving anonymous letters from some 
village representative scolding him of being too moderate and not fighting hard 
enough. {Hong Kong Economic Journal March 14, 1994) 
On March 23, the Legislation was firstly discussed in the LegCo. About a 
thousand of villagers protested outside the LegCo building to support Chairman 
Lau in the meeting. Kan Pin Chi, the chairman of Sheung Shui Rural Committee 
who organized the protest and was widely regarded as the militant within the 
HYK, said that the action was to show "the solidarity of the New Territories 
people in front of the government, and let the government know that we would 
not subject to oppression. It is silly to bother us!" He wamed that if the 
government keep supporting the Bill, they might plan more violent action, such as 
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"nightsoil attack." Though Kan was a member ofHYK, chairman Lau Wong Fat 
and vice-chairman Lam Wai Keung both denied that the villagers' action was 
organized by HYK and said it was spontaneous action. They even did not know 
how many villagers would come when asked by a reporter the day before. 
Most participants were peaceful in the event. But when they confronted 
the counter-protest outside the building, some furious villagers rushed onto them 
and assaulted the pro-Legislation protesters. The mass immediately got wild and 
clamed down only after the police step in to separate the two groups of protesters. 
After the meeting was over, Lau Wong Fat led a petition of 200 villagers to march 
towards the Governor's residency peacefully. They left after the police received 
the petition letter. Lau told the media that though the violence outside the LegCo 
building was spontaneous action of the villagers and he was not going to take 
responsibility of that, though he promised later that the HYK would provide legal 
support to the villagers if they were being prosecuted. {Ming Pao March 23,1994; 
Wa Kiu Yat Po April 25, 1994) 
After the incident, HYK continued their protest by two new strategies. 
One was to send petition group to Beijing to summon the support of the Chinese 
government, as well as the majority of the SAR Preparation Committee, which 
was supposed to be some sort of proto-SAR administration. {Hong Kong 
Economic Daily March 23, 1994) Second was to establish a quasi-military 
organization know as the “ 'protect our families, defend our clans' struggle 
command center" under the HYK. The "command center" was composed of a 
"strategy department", "resource department", and a "war department". {Sun Pao 
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March 26,1994) It conferred speculation and fear among the government officials 
and media that violent and protracted confrontation as expressed in the anti-Waste 
Disposal Regulation movement was coming to a reality. Meanwhile, Lau and 
other rural leaders were busy at negotiating with the government officials after the 
government invited the HYK to go onto the negotiation table to solve the problem 
in "peaceful and reasonable dialogue". {Hong Kong Economic Journal March 23, 
1994) 
Ironically, their threat of radical action never came true. The actions 
organized by the "command center" never bypassed the March 22 one in terms of 
the level of violence. Of course those actions were incomparable with the 
protracted warfare organized by the JCAA a few years earlier. In fact, what the 
"command center" organized was just one demonstration on May 8. All other 
protests were planned by village elders in different areas separately. The local 
rallies and demonstrations were all peaceful, but symbolic violence was vastly 
used. In many of the rallies, paper figures of the Govemor and the politicians 
supporting the Legislation were made, which were executed and bumed. Slogans 
like “execute Chris Pattern!" were heard. Some villagers also claimed that they 
would rape Christin if she dared to go to the New Territories. Some rallies took 
place in the tomb ofthose being killed in the 1899 anti-British violence, and in the 
anti-Japanese cemetery. Each rally had was large. For examples, the one in 
Sheung Shiu area on April 17，the one in Southem district on April 24，and the 
one in Tuen Wan on April 26 were all participated by more than a thousand 
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villagers. {Wah Kiu Yat Po April 25, 1994; Sun Pao April 18; April 26; Wen Wai 
Pao April 27). 
We should note that in most of the local rallies, the name of HYK and 
Rural Committees did not appear as the name of organizers. These actions were 
supposed to be organized by the villagers or village elders spontaneously. The 
leaders o fHYK and Rural Committees were invited as speakers of the rallies. Lau 
Wong Fat attended most of the rallies, and declared that the HYK would be on 
their side, and if any villager was arrested in the any action, HYK would support 
him unreservedly. (Wah Kiu Yat Po April 25, 1994; Sun Pao April 18; April 26; 
Wen Wai Pao April 27). It is quite clear that the HYK leaders preferred the roles 
of supporters, rather than organizers, of these actions, and were not going to take 
responsibility of anything happened. 
In May 8，a mass demonstration was organized by the "command center". 
It was the largest scale action ever in the whole anti-Legislation movement. More 
than ten thousands villagers took part in it. The demonstration was highly 
organized and carefully planned. The participants were transported from their 
village to the starting point by travel coaches. They marched from Wanchai to 
Central. Immediately after the demonstration, the demonstrators were taken back 
home by the coaches. Then a delegation of 27 HYK leaders walked onto the 
Governor's residency to send a petition letter. The whole process was peaceful 
and under control of the HYK. More, as the date of demonstration was the 
Mothers' Day, the organizers had prepared three thousands bunches of flower for 
the female participants in order to make the action look more warm and peaceful. 
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When asked by a reporter why there appeared no radical actions throughout the 
demonstration as threatened by the HYK leaders earlier, Lam Wai Keung, the 
vice-chairman of HYK, answered that HYK was ever a restrained and rational 
organization. (Wah Kiu Yat Pao May 9，1994) 
Simultaneously, the HYK persuasion of the Beijing government tumed out 
to be effective. The Office on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs of the Chinese 
government issued a declaration on March 29, accusing the Hong Kong British 
government of neglecting the legitimate rights of the original inhabitants. The 
declaration interpreted the Legislation as a deliberate act to divide the Hong Kong 
people and created chaos to the society in the advent of sovereignty handover. It 
also asserted that the Legislation was not in line with the Basic Law. 
Despite all these, the Legislation was passed in the LegCo on June 22， 
1994. Surprisingly, no demonstration was organized by the HYK, in contrast with 
the organized violence planed by the JCAA on the date the Waste Disposal 
Regulation Bill was passed in the LegCo. Only dozens of villagers gathered 
outside the LegCo building with banners. The reaction of Lau to the passing of 
the Law was mild. He just commented that "History will make the fair judgment 
at last”. {Ming Pao June 23, 1994) This unexpected tranquillity was not very 
unexpected indeed. What the HYK meant to do with their previous actions was 
just to show their attitude to the public, to the Hong Kong government, and to 
Beijing. There is no reason to argue they did ever believe that the action could 
bring them desirable outcomes. The HYK leaders never abandoned high rank 
104 
negotiation with the colonial authority, and they were diverting more and more 
efforts to persuading the SAR Preparation Committee and Beijing government. 
Right after the passing of the Law, no more demonstration and 
confrontational actions were organized. HYK's strategy was crystal clear. It 
prevented the enactment of the Legislation before the sovereignty by suing the 
government on the one hand, and on the other had lobby the Beijing government 
to guarantee a cancellation of the Law after July 1，1997. (Wah Kiu Yat Po Jan 6， 
1995; Jan 3，1995) The waves of actions in March and April of 1994 were just 
flashes on the pan. What was actually desired by the rural elite was a peaceful and 
institutional resolution of the conflict. 
Interesting enough, the SAR Preparation Committee rejected the idea of 
canceling the Land Inheritance Legislation after the sovereignty handover in the 
January of 1997 as it had promised earlier. It created controversy within the HYK 
on what was to be done. Lau walked out an SAR Preparation meeting on the issue 
to protest, and special meetings of HKY were summoned to discuss the strategy 
of further actions. In those meetings, plans for radical action were raised. They 
include organizing large-scale demonstration, rally to bum the Basic Law, 
boycotting the sovereignty handover ceremony, and even attacking the News 
China News Agency and the would-be SAR chief executive office. The village 
representatives complained that they had been betrayed by the Chinese 
government. And the militant rural leaders, Kan Ping Chi, stood at the forefront 
again and declared he would resort to any mean necessary to protect their rights, 
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"British and Chinese governments are the same, they both look down on the New 
Territories people". (MingPao Jan 22, 1997) 
After a two day discussion, a resolution was passed by the HYK on Jan 23 
that no confrontational action would be used. The HYK decided to "reflect their 
viewpoints，，to the China government "with reasons." In the meeting, some 
representatives asserted that Lau Wong Fat did not fight hard and should step 
down. Lau responded that his walk-out protest in the Preparation Committee 
meeting was radical enough. He was supported by many other representatives 
who argued that the HYK should resorted to peaceful and rational action, and 
radical action did harms to their image as well as the "peaceful and stable 
transition". {Hong Kong Economic Journal Feb 4，1997) 
After the resolution, the HYK leaders renewed their efforts oflobbying by 
sending petition letter and discussing the issue with the high rank officials in the 
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, and the members in the SAR Preparation 
Committee. The would-be SAR Executive Administrator set up a special 
committee on the issue and invited several prominent rural leaders to discuss with 
the government on the Legislation. Of course, it was a mean to further pacify the 
HYK and brought no benefits to them at last. But anyway, the rural elite cordially 
accept the invitation into the group. {Express Post Jan 24，1997; Hong Kong 
Economics Daily Feb. 3; Hong Kong Economic Joumal Feb. 4; Ming Pao Feb. 5; 
Feb. 14) 
Some village offices and Rural Committees were disappointed by the 
HYK decision. They neglected HYK leadership's preference and planned to 
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initiate rallies in their villages and petition action outside the News China News 
Agency. These disappointed rural leaders keep attacking Lau and told the HYK 
leaders not to intervene into their actions in a HYK meeting. Lau said he did not 
mind the spontaneous actions of the villagers and even the personal attack upon 
him, although he suggested the villagers restraining and prevented any incidents 
affecting the stable transition of sovereignty. Few of these spontaneous actions 
were actualized at last. {MingPao Feb 20，1997; Wen Wei Pao Feb 22，1997) 
The rural elite lost the battle finally. But up till now, no further action 
among the rural leaders was taken except their silence on the issue. 
(2) Analysis 
Over the three-year long protest movement against the Legislation, the 
HYK elite made no attempt to suppress the villagers' collective action. The HYK 
leaders repeated again and again they did not mind the spontaneous action of the 
villagers. They attended their action and promised that they would provide legal 
support to the individual villagers who went violent in the March 22 rally. The 
scale of the movement was comparable the anti-Waste Disposal movement, as the 
largest demonstration witnessed a participation rate of around 10% (10,000 
participants / around 100,000 original inhabitants population)^®. 
28 There are no exact estimation of the total population of original inhabitants. But we can estimate 
from various sources. Before the 1950s the total population of New Territories was around 
100,000. (Ng 1983) It is highly probably that these 10,000 people were mostly original inhabitants. 
Provided with the fact that since the 1950s, large number of original inhabitants has migrated to 
the urban area or Europe, the total number of original inhabitants would remain the same, if not 
decline. It matched with Kuan and Lau (1979) estimation that by 1979，original inhabitants 
remaining in the New Territories were less than 20% of the New Territories total population which 
was more than one million then. As the mobilization networks of the HYK only works with regard 
to the rural dwellers, we can exclude the original inhabitants residing in urban area and in Europe 
from the number of potential participants of the protest. Hence the total number of potential 
participants is taken as around 100,000. 
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To look at the balance sheet of the movement over the three years, we can 
see the rural leaders relied much more heavily on negotiation than on 
confrontational action as the primary mean of pushing their demands. The 
confrontational mobilizations in the March and April of 1994 were brief. They 
never exceeded the role of supporting the HYK institutionalized negotiation with 
the authorities - the Hong Kong government and would-be SAR government, as 
well as the Beijing government. The rural leaders as the mobilizers did never 
intent to get what they wanted through these confrontational actions. Li reality, 
the most violent action on March 22, and many other local rallies and 
demonstration, were not organized by HYK. The only action initiated by the HYK 
was the highly restrained May 8 demonstration, which was carefully planned to 
avoid any out-fo-control confrontation (the coaches taking protesters back home 
immediately after the march, the delivery of flower to low the tension expressed 
by the action, etc.) At the critical moment when the Legislation was passed, there 
were even no mobilization at all. After that, the HYK simply turned to Beijing for 
help, and the issue became an issue of high politics involving close-door dialogue 
and bargaining, nothing more or less. 
HYK in this case cannot be regarded as an autonomous mobilizing 
organization vis-a-vis the state. Yes, it is true that its relation with the British 
authority was at stake in the 1990s. But it does not mean that their institutional 
integration with the government administration was weakened. They expected 
that their relation with the authority would remain unchanged after the 
sovereignty handover. Hence their parting with the British authority had never 
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urged them to look for another source of legitimacy alternative to the state. When 
they found that the Hong Kong - British government stopped conceding to their 
demands in the transition period, they simply tumed to Beijing and the would-be 
SAR (or the casual relationship was reversed). In this context, many quarrels 
between the rural elite and the Hong Kong-British government in the transition 
period, including the issue ofLand Inheritance Legislation, were transformed into 
part of the quarrels between the British and Chinese government. HYK had never 
detached from the high institutional politics, and abandoned their practice of 
deriving its legitimacy from above. 
HYK's non-suppressive stand towards the confrontation mobilization 
from below and their reluctance of taking any responsibility of these actions, 
together with their emphasis of "peaceful and rational" approach to push their 
demands themselves are not difficult to be comprehended. The HYK leaders' 
stand was probably a result of a precarious balance between three considerations. 
First, the spontaneous confrontation action from below could increase their 
bargaining power on the table by letting the pro-Chinese authorities value its 
cooperation in keeping social stability. But at the same time, they could not go too 
far as they had to avoid the accusation of disrupting the "stable and peaceful 
transition" themselves. Hence they chose to show their restrain and not taking the 
responsibility of the confrontational actions. It should be noted that after the 
proto-SAR government tumed down their request, and all bargaining efforts were 
futile in changing the situation, the rural elite could find no further things to do 
other than resorting to hallow threats of boycotting the sovereignty handover 
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ceremony and accepting proto-SAR government's invitation of dialogue (no 
matter how helpless it is) cordially. 
At the same time，the localized and somehow spontaneous confrontational 
rallies, as well as the discontent of the villagers and individual rural leaders with 
the HYK moderate approach could hardly sustain and converge into larger scale 
and sustainable confrontational action without an organization independent of the 
state and HYK. Furthermore, the "village elders" who initiated the spontaneous 
action were not totally out of the HYK structure. Many of them were members of 
HYK. (such as Kan Ping Chi) Though they were bold in mobilizing radical action 
out of the HYK's orbit and voicing their critique ofHYK leaders, they knew their 
action could not go too far unless they meant to break from the HYK system. It 
was unlikely that they would do so as HYK was a significant source of their 
wealth and power. 
This case is similar to the case of So Kun Wat as discussed before, in the 
sense that "institutaionalized resolution of conflict" did exist between the elite 
organization (HYK and Farmers Association respectively) and the government 
(Hong Kong-British or SAR government). But the fundamental difference 
between the two cases is that in the So Kun Wat case, what rural elite did was to 
initiate the negotiation before the grievances converged into collective action; 
while in the other case, the HYK did not show any attempt to preempt, let alone 
suppress, the mobilization from below. More, the leaders even fanned the 
grassroots mobilization by declaring openly that they did not mind spontaneuous 
action of the villagers, though they would not take the responsibility for that. 
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In conclusion, the absence of elite suppression in the case of Land 
Inheritance Legislation led to high participation rate of grassroots mobilization, 
though the movement itself was principally non-confrontational with the absence 
of autonomous organization. 
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Intermediate Case II: Presence of Elite Suppression and Presence of 
Autonomous Organization 
The Case ofShun Wai'' 
The rapid development of Shun Wai has caused environmental problems 
to the area. They included the pollution of the Sham Tsuen nullah and the noise 
pollution from the Tuen Mun highway Shun Wai section. An NLCDP social 
workers team arrived at the community by the mid-eighties and began mobilizing 
the residents to concem and cope with these problems. However, the local elite, 
predominantly the Hakka elite and Chiu Chow community leaders, thought that 
the social workers activities were challenging their hegemony and against their 
interest. They tried to deter the mobilization by different means. In spite of the 
elite suppression, the mobilization continued, though participation rate of their 
protest action was low. 
(1) The setting 
There were eight villages in the Shun Wai area and the population in the 
area was 3,400 in 1989 according to the City and New Territories 
Administration's figure. The largest village is Shun Wai village constituted by a 
Hakka lineage sumamed 'Fu'. Their ancestors settled in the area more than one 
hundred years ago. Like other lineage village, there was a Shun Wai Village 
29 The case study is based on my interview with the social workers working for the NLCDP team 
in Shun Wai, together with a published article written by a former Shun Wai social worker. All the 
names mentioned are pseudonyms for the protection of the subjects. 
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Office and the Headman was the representative in the Tuen Mun Rural 
Committee. The Village Office was the most influential organization in the area. 
Besides the Hakka villagers, there were also villages of rural squatters 
built by the immigrant farmers who settled in the area between 1950s to 1970s 
and cultivated on the land rented from the Sham Tsuen villagers. There were 
several organizations among the immigrant farmers' community. They were the 
Shun Wai Chamber of Commerce, Shun Wai Chiu Chow Welfare Association, 
Shun Wai East Village Welfare Association and the Shun Wai Pai Min Kok 
Village Cooperative Society. The first one was joined by both the Hakka villagers 
and the immigrant farmers who had become rich and started their business 
(principally restaurants) in the area. The latter ones were joined mostly by the 
immigrant farmers. As one resident in Shun Wai said, the Chiu Chow people are 
in strong solidarity, so the Chiu Chow Welfare Association was influential in the 
area. Moreover, the cooperative in the area was only important in the immigrant 
tenants' economic life, if it had any importance at all. However, as a social 
worker who had worked there for a couple of years commented, ‘They [the 
different organizations mentioned above] represented different interests of people 
in Shun Wai but the leaders of these organizations were typically paternalistic and 
conservative' (Chang 1993: 150) 
Also, the indigenous elite and Chiu Chow community leaders were in 
good relation with each other. Most immigrants would likely to ask either the 
Hakka or Chiu Chow elite for help when they had problems, especially those 
requiring the interaction with government officials. Hence, it would be regarded 
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that the Chiu Chow leaders and the Hakka elite constituted a hegemonic strata in 
the area. They were influential in both the original inhabitants and immigrant 
communities. 
From the 1970s, increasing number of immigrant farmers abandoned 
farming. Some moved to urban area but more stayed in the area as the industrial 
area nearby provided many employment opportunities. In the 1970s, the 
transportation links between Tsuen Wan the Tuen Mun were improved. Factories 
moved in. They included Garden Company, San Miguel Brewery, Kowloon 
Textile Industries and Union Carbide Asia. Moreover, wealthier villagers in the 
area, the Hakka and the Chiu Chow residents alike, shared the fortunes by 
opening “roast duck" restaurants. Some of the capital came from the 
compensation paid by the Government when the villagers were relocated during 
the construction of Tuen Mun Highway. The restaurants became a monopoly 
business of the Hakka and Chiu Chow elite. 
(2) The NLCDP team 
In 1986, Shun Wai was identified as a deprived community by the 
government in view of its income levels and remoteness from existing social 
services. Hence, the Shun Wai and Lung Tsing Neighbourhood Level Community 
Development Project was launched. An NLCDP team was introduced into the 
area. The Shun Wai village Headman was requested by the District Officers to 
spare a floor of the village house for the social workers to use as their office. The 
main task of the team was to 'encourage grassroots participation to improve the 
quality ofl ife of the local community'. (Chang 1993:150) 
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Like other NLCDP team, the Shun Wai team started by establishing 
harmonious relation with the residents and building up their image as the servants 
of them through organizing entertainment and recreational activities. Most of 
theses activities were nominally co-organized by the Village Office. A point to 
note is that the social workers were all employed by the Tung Wan Social Service 
Center which was renowned for its believe that community problem could only be 
solved by grassroots mobilization and direct social action. Both Hakka villagers 
and immigrant tenants were supposed to be their clients, and there were members 
from both ethnic group to participate in their functions. 
(3)The issue 
After establishing themselves in the community. The social workers began 
directing their energy to more concrete community problems. Several issues were 
identified as starting point for mobilization. The first issue was the pollution 
problem of the Shun Wai nullah which ran across the area. 
Since the 1970s, the environmental condition of the nullah had been 
deteriorating as residential density of the area kept increasing. By the 1980s, the 
river became viscous, stinky and black. There were two main sources of pollution. 
One was the household sewage discharged into the nullah without any prior 
treatment. The other was the greasy and oily effluent discharged excessively into 
the nullah from the roast duck restaurants, ln. 1987，the social workers conducted 
a community survey to assess the residents' opinion towards the pollution of the 
nullah. They found that most residents recognized the bad odor of the nullah 
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would cause hygiene as well as health problem to them. Waste materials 
deposited in the nullah also caused flooding in summer. 
The NLCDP workers tried to increase the residents' concem of the 
problem through its youth and women groups originally organized for more "soft" 
kind of activities. Letters of petition were prepared to request the government to 
increase the monitoring of sewage and waste along the nullah, and increase the 
frequency of desilting operation. The local elite regarded their efforts as offensive 
because the increasing governmental monitoring of the river condition and 
sewage discharge meant their restaurants would become less free to get rid of 
their waste and they might be charged of polluting the nullah. 
The second issue identified by the social workers was the noise pollution 
caused and potential danger posed by the Tuen Mun Highway nearby. (Chang 
1993:153) Although there were parapet walls along both sides of the highway, 
these were not high enough to prevent objects or surface water from falling and 
splashing down. On one occasion, a traffic accident occurred on the highway and 
a heavy vehicle crashed through the parapet. It was suspended from the elevated 
road section. Many residents worried that one day there would be a vehicle falling 
down onto the residential area and incurred heavy casualties. In addition, the 
noise generated by the traffic annoyed the residents. 
With regard to the above mentioned problem, a concem group called 
'Tuen Mun Road Problem' was formed by some Shun Wai residents, social 
workers and a District Board member in the area. In 1989，a community survey 
was conducted to explore the residents' opinions towards the problem. The survey 
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results showed that the noise pollution was serious and many people were afraid 
of the danger posed from above. 
The concem group then wrote a letter to the government's chief highway 
engineer (structure) to spell out the residents' opinions and make a few 
suggestions to alleviate the problem. The suggestions included installation of a 
permanent sound-insulating facility along the flyover over Shun Wai so that the 
traffic noise and the danger ofobjects falling down could be reduced. Lowering of 
the maximum speed of the traffic in the highway section over Shun Wai was also 
requested. 
These early efforts of the social workers on the two issues irritated the 
local elite. According to Chang (1993: 157)，the two petition letters offended the 
Village Headman. He protested that the social workers, as outsiders, were 
intervening into and disrupting the village affairs seriously. He asked the NLCDP 
team to stop what they were working on. 
In addition to the formal protest from the Village Headman, the local elite 
had many other means to fetter the team's activities. According to my informant 
who was a social worker in the team. ‘Gossip is a powerful weapon o f the e l i t e � � 
he said. He told me that the elite always created absurd rumors about them and let 
them spread among the villagers. Under the rumors' portrayal, the social workers, 
as outsiders, were brought o f fby the government to bring chaos to village life and 
create cleavages in their community life. If the villagers let them go on，the 
solidarity of the residents would be dissolved and the authority of the village 
leaders, who were supposed to be the most wholehearted servants of the villagers, 
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would be weakened. Sometimes, the elite would even resort to coercive means. At 
one occasion, several stout villagers broke into a meeting of a community concem 
group and forced the resident members to leave immediately. At another case, the 
Village Headman threatened that he would kick them away from the Village 
Office if they did not stop some specific activities. 
However, the social workers did not think they need to look onto the local 
elite's face to decide if they should go on or not. They were determined to resist 
the elite's deterrence. 'We understand why they [the indigenous and Chiu Chow 
elite] are contemptuous to us as our job would destabilize their legitimacy and 
leadership in the village. We also understand that the residents are afraid of them 
and would refuse to join us because of this. But we are not afraid of them as the 
villagers do. If we are afraid, they would be more powerful and the residents 
would become more afraid of them and apathetic to the community affairs. It is 
our responsibility to change the situation. In addition, they would dare not really 
expelled us, as we were assigned here by the District Officer and backed up by it, 
at least apparently' According to my informant, the NLCDP team was still active 
in organizing residents' concem groups and mobilizing the villagers for social 
actions disregarding the obstacles. In fact, in recent years, they were still running 
concem groups on various issues such as the sewage and hygiene problem in the 
squatter area and 'dangerous slope’ problem. Petition and protest actions were 
occasionally launched, in addition to meetings with government officials and 
writing petition letters. 
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In 1995 and 1996, the team organized a labour group to among the 
residents who worked in the nearby industrial site. When some of the workers' 
livelihoods were threatened when one of the plants was planning a cutting down 
of employment size, radical actions such as blocking the entrance of the plant or 
wildcat strikes were initiated. Besides, activities of workers safety and health 
promotion were run in the community. Protest actions were occasionally 
organized out of the government's labour office. 
However, the participation rates of the NLCDP's concem groups, let alone 
each protest action, were always low. The size of each group would hardly larger 
than 20 members, and the maximum number of protest participants was about the 
same. 
(4) Analysis 
In the case, the local elite were suppressive to the social workers' efforts 
in organizing. Provided with the elite's deterrent efforts, and their weapon of 
gossips and rumours, many villagers were afraid of working too close with the 
NLCDP, especially when collective action and activities related to concrete 
communities problems were involved. This highly restricted the protest intensity 
of NLCDP organized actions in terms of the participation rate. (If we take the 20 
participants maximum, the participation rate was fewer than 1% - 20 / 3,400 
residents) 
However, the protest intensity was high when we judge by the level of 
confrontation. As the NLCDP workers did not depend on the assistance of either 
the government or its agent (the rural elite) in the village to develop their 
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legitimacy, they felt feel to adopt any tactics in the collective action as long as 
they believed the tactics were necessary and good for the residents. They did not 
have the constraint faced by the HYK or cooperatives so that they need not 
channel all conflicts resolutions to institutionalized negotiations with the authority 
- though it remained to be one of the many options. In reality, the NLCDP was 
prone to confrontational form of action, as they had to build up their legitimacy 
among the villagers by making them believe they were fighting hard and boldly 
for their improvement of livelihoods.(they always assumed that the villagers 
tumed away from their confrontational action just because of the pressure of the 
elite and the residents would appreciate their work anyway) It is why they would 
always conduct community survey to find out the most concerned issues to work 
on. 
The situation faced by the NLCDP was similar to that faced by the leftist 
groups in the New Territories. To compete with the rural elite for legitimacy 
among the villagers, it had no point for the social workers to rely on 
insitutionalized negotiation with the government to help solving the community 
problems, as the rural elite were always much better at this. So they had to offer 
an alternative option to the villagers. At the same time, according to the social 
workers in Shun Wai, many villagers were in fact dissatisfied with the village 
leaders as they thought that the latter always compromised their interests to 
outsiders and did not fight hard enough. These discontented villagers were 
potential supporters of NLCDP confrontational mobilization. To put it in another 
way, the mechanism of incentive dispensation between the rural elite and the 
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villagers would certainly create a group of villagers - usually the majority - whose 
interests were overlooked compared to other villagers close and loyal to the elite. 
The confrontational actions adopted by the social workers (or leftist organizations 
alike) would be welcomed by these villagers - though they might be afraid of 
joining the actions because of the elite's suppressive stand. 
This case shows how confrontational mobilization emerged and sustained 
in the presence of autonomous organization, though the participation rate was 
very low because of the pressence of elite suppression. 
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The Case of Hung Wan^° 
From 1994 to 1995, some villagers of the Hung Wan Village and social 
workers from an NLCDP team in the area protested against the construction of 
pylons in and 400kV power lines over their village. They formed a 'Concem 
Group for the Hung Wan Residents Influenced by the Power Line’. The Concem 
Group acted as an movement organization mobilizing support from the villagers 
and confronted relatively weak suppression from the rural elite. 
(1) Setting of the village 
Hung Wan Village situated in Tuen Mun and was surrounded by three 
Hakka villages. Most Hung Wan villagers were not original inhabitants and were 
immigrant farmers renting land from the Hakka landlords. At the moment of my 
research, Hung Wan had about 3,000 residents. The cultivated land in Hung Wan 
was owned differentially by the villagers in the neighbour Hakka villages. As 
mentioned before, the immigrant farmers rarely lived in the lineage villages. In 
the 1960s，the immigrant tenants built their own rural squatters in the present 
Hung Wan area. Their squatters tended to cluster together. By that time, the place 
was not called Hung Wan yet. 
The backgrounds of the tenant farmers were very diverse. Some were 
immigrants from mainland China who do not want to go to the urban area. Some 
were urban dwellers who changed their occupation to farmer in the 1960s or 
1970s when there was unemployment in the city. Some were original inhabitants 
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living in the surrounding villages but did not own cultivable land. In spite of the 
diversity in backgrounds, the farmers gradually became very familiar with each 
other and developed some sense of collective identity among themselves. Most of 
them thought that they were looked down upon, or even bullied, by their Hakka 
neighbours. 'We do not have good connection with the government officials, we 
do not have the rights enjoyed by other indigenous inhabitants, but we are in 
solidarity', described by an old Hung Wan villager who was active in protesting 
against the pylons. He also told me that in the past when there were still many 
villagers farming on their land, they always bargained with their landlords 
collectively. 
As the land of the area was owned by villagers from three different 
villages, it did not have a name before. It was the tenant fanners there who named 
the place as Hung Wan Village. It was named so because there had been an 
orchard called Hung Wan nearby. The orchard was closed about twenty years 
before. 
In the 1970s, some active villagers organized themselves into a Fa Pao 
Wui to organize celebration activities in traditional Chinese festivals and raising 
funds for some kinds of village welfare. The Fa Pao Wui rapidly became a 
mouthpiece for the Hung Wan villagers to deal with outsiders such as the original 
inhabitants and government officials. It performed some functions of a Village 
Office in other lineage villages. However, it was not recognized by the 
3° Between August 1994 and March 1995, I participated in the protest action. The following 
description of the case is based on my recollection ofthe event. 
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government until 1980s. Similarly, the Hung Wan Village was not recognized 
officially in the government's rural administration until then. 
In the 1980s, most villagers abandoned farming and found jobs in the 
urban areas. Some of them moved out while some of them remained and built 
permanent village houses on the land they rented. The villagers had to get a 
permission from the government prior to the building. Hung Wan was 
transformed into a densely populated area with only a few vegetable gardens 
remained. 
In 1985, the Fa Pao Wui was renamed as the Village Office ofHung Wan. 
It was recognized legally by the government. A Village Headman was produced 
through a village-wide election. There was also a committee of deputy directors in 
the Office. The committee was made up of the ‘elders’ in the village. Li 1990，the 
Village Headman became the member of the Tuen Mun Rural Committee. 
Nevertheless, from the gossips of the villagers, it can be found that the 
Village Representative^' was widely regarded as the puppet of the original 
inhabitants. According to one of my informants, he shared exclusive information 
about and material benefits arising from government's development project in the 
area by selling out the interests of the villagers. 'He works for the interests of the 
neighbouring villages, not ours!’ complained by one villagers^ But when asked 
31 The Village Representative ofHung Wan has not been changed since 1985. 
“ O n e example mentioned by the villagers is about the location for the Hung Wan Station of the 
Light Transit Railway. It was said that the LTR company had consulted the Rural Committee for 
the selection of the location. The Hung Wan Representative did not fight for the villagers' 
interests but sided with the Representative from Lai Uk Village which is next to Hung Wan. The 
result of the meeting is that the Hung Wan station was made close to the Lai Uk Village but very 
far away from the main entrance ofthe Hung Wan Village. 
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why the villagers keep electing him as the Headman, he expressed that though the 
villagers did not like him, he was the one who was known well by the original 
inhabitants and the government officials, so they had no choice but let him 
continue be the mediator between the villagers and the outsiders. 
(2) The NLCDP team 
In the 1970s through late 1980s, there has been a temporary housing area 
in-between the Hung Wan Village and the Lung Uk Village and the government 
has assigned an NLCDP team to the THA. The THA was demolished completely 
in 1988. The District Office allowed the team to continue providing service in the 
area. The social workers moved their office to the second floor of the Village 
Office. Owing to the vicinity of the Hung Wan Village to the former THA site, 
many Hung Wan villagers had already been active participants of the NLCDP's 
activities. It was natural for the social workers to choose Hung Wan as their new 
base. 
The activities of the team in Hung Wan were mostly recreational. Though 
these activities were organized by the social workers, they were said to be co-
organized by the Village Office to the public. This was why the Village leaders 
felt comfortable with the social workers. At the same time, a number of villagers 
were active in the activities, and they became the members of some hobby groups 
under the NLCDP team. 
(3) The issue 
In November 1994，the villagers were informed that the China Light 
Company was going to construct two pylons in Hung Wan and bunches of400 kV 
125 
high voltage power lines would run across the most densely populated area in the 
village. The villagers were very anxious of the hazards caused by the high voltage 
power overhead33 and worried that it would bring disaster to them if the 
transmission lines were wrecked by thunderstorm. 
Most villagers believed that the power company let the power line run 
through Hung Wan but not other nearby villages because it did not want to 
antagonize the original inhabitants. ‘ Not only the original inhabitants look 
down on us, even the power company is looking down on u s . � s a i d one villagers. 
Mr. Chan, an elder in the village, launched a signature campaign by himself 
against the project. He gathered several hundreds signatures in the village and 
gave it to the Headman to urge him for showing a protesting stand against the 
project. As Mr. Chan recalled, the Headman went very angry and accused Mr. 
Chan of stirring up the village live. He warned Chan not to involve to this issue 
any more. He said that he would reflect the villagers' viewpoint to the leaders of 
nearby villagers, the government and power company, and it was none ofChan 's 
business. After an emotional quarrel, Mr. Chan took the signatures with him and 
discussed with the social workers. 
Several active villagers agreed that they had to do something against the 
project in spite o f the Village Representative's deterrence. One of them was Mrs. 
Leung who later became a spokesperson of the Concem Group. She was in the 
50s and was a daughter of the Village Headman in a neighbour Hakka village, and 
bought a house in Hung Wan after marrying an urban dweller. Though she could 
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hardly share any influence in her lineage, she got much information from her 
brothers. She also had an outspoken personality and had long been regarded as 
one of the informal leaders of the village. What those villagers thought o fwas to 
go to discuss the issue with the social workers. 
Being aware of the significance of the issue in the village, the social 
worker conducted a village-wide survey on the resident's attitude towards the 
project in April 1995. It was found that an overwhelming majority was opposing 
the construction of the power line. On June 6 1995, they summoned a village 
assembly.34 In the meeting, a protest action was planned and the villagers were 
mobilized. Moreover, the Concem Group was formed. The Group was constituted 
by more than ten members including the social workers, Mrs. Leung, Mr. Chan 
and some other active villagers. In June 8，the villagers launched the first protest 
action out of the headquarter of the Land and Planning Department in Central?� In 
the following month, a series of actions were organized by the Concem Group. 
Besides protesting out of government offices, they also asked for help from the 
Legislative Councilors and the Heung Yee Kuk. They also sent petition letters to 
the relevant government officials. 
One of the strategy of the Group was to catch the media attention by 
dramatic action and tried to put pressure on the government officials through the 
media attention. In a demonstration outside the LegCo, a bamboo model of pylon 
“Though there is a debate over the effect of high voltage power to human's health, the villagers 
strongly believed that it was hazardous. 
34 Ofcourse, the assembly was nominally co-organized by the Village Office. 
“Though the power company has chosen the site for construction the pylon, the construction was 
up to the approval of the Land and Planning Department. 
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was made with a logo of the power company attached on it. At the end of the 
action, the villagers destroyed the model by stepping on it violently. This 
villagers' action became an eye-catching photo in the newspaper the day after. 
Proto-violent tactics were also used. Fearing that the power company 
would start building the pylons within the village (the company owned two plots 
of land in the village as the site of construction) and brought the proposed course 
of power line closer to reality, the Concem Group developed some sort of alarm 
system. A retired old women in the Group was assigned to stay at home, which 
was near one of the site, every moming. She was responsible for informing other 
members when she observed any construction work in the site. One moming in 
September, she found that some workers from the power company was doing land 
survey in the sites where pylons were to be built. The alerted members of the 
Concem Group acted up immediately and came to the surveyors with spades and 
sickles. They asked why they were allowed to begin the construction before the 
government granted permission to the project. The quarrel became a scene and 
attracted dozens of villagers to gather. The surveyors got nervous, asked for the 
instruction from their boss through mobile phone, and at last left the village. 
Simultaneously, the Concem Group drafted an alternative plan proposing 
the power company to build the pylons on the former THA site which was then an 
open ground. The site was in-between the Lung Uk Village and Hung Wan. The 
Concem Group members thought that their alternative plan could minimize the 
impact of the high voltage power on the population in the region, but they also 
expected that the rural elite from Lung Uk would object their proposal as it would 
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bring the power lines closer to them. Anyway, another village assembly was 
called and the alternative plan was adopted. From then on, the action of the 
Concem Group targeted on urging the power company and the government to 
change the course of the power lines according to their proposal. 
Although the Village Headman seemed to support the action of the 
Concem Group, some members of the Group complained that he was in fact 
‘dragging the backleg' of their actions. When the issue was near to an end, a 
member of the Concem Group told me that once the Group was formed, the 
Headman had blamed the social workers for bringing chaos to the village, and 
impeded the functioning of the Concem Group by threatening to expel them from 
the Village Office building. But in front of the resolution of the Concem Group 
and the legitimacy they gained among the villagers, the Headman dared not resort 
to open opposition to the Concem Group activities. 
In October, some villagers knew from the government officials that their 
Village Representative had sent a letter to the government and power company, 
stating that he did not support the alternative proposal of the Concem Group as 
the proposed new course of power lines would bring hazards to the lineage village 
nearby. The letter was co-signed by the Headmen of Hung Wan's neighbouring 
villages. Also in October, Miss Wen, another influential villagers in Hung Wan, 
and her followers, also with some villagers living closer to the Lung Uk Village, 
came out suddenly and challenged the legitimacy of the Concem Group, claiming 
that it did not represent their interests. According to some villagers, Miss Wen 
was contemptuous towards the Village Representation as she had very good 
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connection with the Rural Committee members. But this time, she aligned with 
the Headman and suggested to from another Concem Group superior to the 
former one under the Headman's direct leadership and without the interference of 
the social workers. 
Confronted with such buming issues, an emergency village assembly was 
called in early November. It was widely believed that Miss Wen's mobilization of 
discontent villagers against the Concem Group was backed up by the indigenous 
inhabitant elite, for she had been elected to be a District Broad Councilors with 
the support of the Rural Committees members. Some villagers also said that they 
always saw Lau Wong Fat's, chairman of Heung Yee Kuk, saloon parking out of 
her house the day before the emergency assembly. 
There were a number of speculations among the Concem Group members 
to explain the Village Headman's and Miss Wen's opposition to the Concem 
Group. One was that they both had good relation with the HYK elite, though they 
themselves were not original inhabitants themselves, and they got many actual 
benefits from this good relation, such as information on government development 
plans, and the recognition of the government (villagers thought that the Village 
Headman could access to the government officials, and got the Hung Wan Village 
recognized as a formal Village only because of the rural elite's support) or 
political support in the District Broad election. We can say that the Hung Wan 
Village Office, as well as Miss Wen as an informal leader in the village, were 
incorporated into the govemment-HYK-village leaders chain of incentive 
dispensation. Some villagers even accused that the Headman had received bribes 
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from the power company. The last reasons for the Headman was suggested by 
what he told Mr. Chan at the very beginning: he did not want the social workers 
and the Concem Group to intervene into this affair as he himself was supposed to 
be the unique legitimate person to deal with the outsiders. He could imagine that 
when the Concem Group got more support from the villagers and its efforts were 
successful at last, the villagers would tum away from him to ask for the help of 
the social workers or the informal leaders within the Concem Group when they 
had troubles. 
Let us go back to the emergency assembly. In the meeting, many villagers 
followed the Concem Group members to attack the Village Head fiercely. He did 
not answer the query of the villagers and just repeated again and again in the past 
twenty years, how he served for the community wholeheartedly. At last, facing 
the accusation of betraying the village's interests, the Headman were forced to 
admit that the power company had approached him and tried to co-opt him by 
donating money to the Village Office under his name. But he supplemented that 
he had refused to accept the ‘donation，as he was really working for the interests 
ofHung Wan. In the meeting, a resolution was made to urge the Headman writing 
off his first letter and send another letter to the Government expressing his 
support for the alternative proposal. Under the great pressure from the Concem 
Group and the angry villagers, he promised to do so. On the other hand, though 
the anti-Concem Group villagers was a minority in the meeting, they successfully 
brought forth an extended committee on the power lines issue to review the 
alternative proposal. The group was chaired by the Village Headman with the 
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social workers as secretaries, and all other villagers were free to join the group if 
they go to the NLCDP office to registrate in the coming week. 
In the following week, the two antagonistic parties persuaded the villagers 
to take their sides andjoin the group. Eventually, the pro-Concem Group villagers 
outnumbered their opponents and the group decided that the original Concem 
Group could continue their action and the alternative proposal would not be 
abandoned. Failed to forestall the activities of the Concem Group, Miss Wen and 
her followers organized themselves into another Concem Group as their platform 
to continue opposing the Concem Group proposal. In front of the two antagonistic 
groups, the Headman took a comfortable stand of being neutral. He justified his 
position by claiming that as the village leader, he had the responsibility to 
arbitrate between villagers with different viewpoints. In the following months, 
banners with contradictory standpoints on the issue could be seen simultaneously 
in the village. 
This "crisis" of the movement happened in the month when the 
government was about to make the decision of approving the power company 
plans or not. In the Concem Group's original plan, larger scale protest action had 
to be organized in this critical period. Methods to mobilize more villagers to go 
protesting in Central (previous protests were participated by at most 10 villagers 
excluding the social workers) were worked out. They include issuing a newsletter 
to every villager updating the situation, and planning demonstration on Sundays. 
However, these efforts failed. The number of demonstrators never 
exceeded 20. There might be multiple reasons behind this failure. But my 
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interview with a few villagers who did not join the action suggested a reasonable 
explanation. They werejust confused by the contradictory messages from the two 
opposing mobilizing groups. They also perceived that the movement had 
developed a village infighting, and they were reluctant to take side as they did not 
want to be seen as an enemy by either side. So they chose ‘‘neutral，，to the issue 
and refused to participate in any action. Worse, a few members in the Concem 
Group felt frustrated and tumed inactive. They believed that the movement had no 
future as the government would have good excuse to tum down the Concem 
Group proposal provided with the village infighting. 
In the early 1996，the Executive Council reached a final decision on the 
course of power lines. The alternative proposal was rejected. A meeting of the 
Concem Group was called to discuss what is to be done. Some members proposed 
to mobilize the villagers to block the village and keep the construction workers 
out. Some other members got nervous and wamed that this might cause the 
intervention of the police and uncontrolled violence would ensue. The villagers 
seemed not particularly impressed by the social workers' warning and keep 
considering the possibility of blocking the village. At last the proposal was 
abandoned as they did not think many villagers would participate in such action, 
given the support of the Concem Group was declining after the split among the 
villagers. They were aware of the fact that high level of solidarity and 
participation among the villagers were necessary conditions for such actions and 
that these conditions did not exist. A resolution was passed in the meeting to write 
a petition letter to the Governor to call for a withdrawal ofgovemment 's decision. 
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Needless to say, the villagers did not think it would succeed. After that meeting, 
more and more active villagers lost their enthusiasm. The group was soon 
paralyzed, and the pylons built. 
(4) Analysis 
In this case, we can see how a protest movement emerged and sustained in 
spite of suppression from the rural elite. The role ofthe Concem Group comprised 
of social workers and informal leaders of the village was crucial in the 
mobilization process. Without their initiation - the initial village-wide survey, the 
summon of villagers assembly, the encouragement given to the villagers to voice 
out their discontent ofthe Village Headman, and their active organizing efforts - it 
was unimaginable how the scattered grievances of the villagers would converge to 
collective action under the suppression of the Headman and other elite, and how 
the counter-mobilization attempts of the rural elite could be resisted. 
Spontaneous actions of individual villagers (such as that of Mr. Chan 
signature campaign) would broke out even without the NLCDP, but they would 
hardly sustain without the social workers. (What Mr. Chan thought of after 
confronting the suppression of the Headman was to go to talk with the social 
workers) The NLCDP did bring the scattered spontaneous actions into organized 
and sustainable action. 
The autonomy of the Concem Group also allowed it to adopt a 
confrontational approach in the protest. This was in sharp contrast with the village 
headman original approach to the issue. As the headman told Chan when trying to 
stop his involvement into the affair, he said that he would reflect the villagers' 
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viewpoint to the government, power company and other village leaders concerned. 
This obviously means that he was in fact going to solve the problem by close door 
negotiation with other parties. Moreover, provided with the non-confrontational 
approach of the village headman, the only choice left for the Concem Group was 
to gather the support from the villagers discontented with the village office and to 
solve the problem through confrontational means. 
Of course, the efforts of the Concem Group as an autonomous 
organization could not solve all the problems and cancelled out the negative effect 
of the elite suppression on the mobilization totally. As seen, the chaos brought 
forth by the headman and Miss Wen to hinder the functioning of the Concem 
Group were effective to a certain extend. As we have seen, it successfully 
forestalled larger scale mobilization among the villagers, and kept the protest 
action confined to a few people. In other words, the elite suppression was 
effectuated through restraining the rate of participation (less than 1% - 20 / 3,000 
villagers), while it was ineffective in preventing the confrontation approach 
adopted by the Group. This case shows how a confrontational action was 
sustained in the presence of autonomous organization though the participation rate 
remained very low because of the elite suppression. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Discussion 
Comparative Analysis 
Summarizing the combination ofindependent and dependent variables, the 
six cases discussed can be presented in the following table: 
Case Elite Autonomous Org. Protest Intensity 
Suppression  
Strategy Participation  
rate  
Chan Wai, So Kun Wat + - Non-Confrontational Low 
Shun Wai, Hung Wan + + Confrontational Low 
Land Inheritance - - Non-Confrontational High 
Legislation  




From the above table, we can see clearly how the two independent 
variables determine the intensity of a protest. Different independent variables 
affect different dimensions of the protest intensity. We can conclude that: 
(1) Both “absence/presence of elite suppression" and "absence/presence of 
organization autonomous from the state" are important variables determining the 
protest intensity, provided that there are already conflicts to be resolved. 
(2) The "absence/presence of elite suppression" variable determines protest 
intensity by determining the participation rate of the protest primarily. The 
presence of elite suppression reduces the protest intensity by reducing the 
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participation rate; the absence of elite suppression increases the protest intensity 
by increasing the participation rate. 
(3) The "absence/presence of organization autonomous from the state" variable 
determines protest intensity by determining the choice of confrontational or non-
confrontational approach. The presence of organization autonomous from the 
state increases the protest intensity by increasing the inclination to the adoption of 
confrontational strategy. The absence of autonomous organization reduced the 
protest intensity by reducing the inclination to the use of confrontational strategy, 
and increase the inclination to institutionalized means of conflict resolution. 
It should be noted that the specific way the independent variables 
determine protest intensity as shown in our analysis is only valid with respect to 
the rural setting of Hong Kong, and may be divergent from the prediction of 
social movement theory focusing on the Westem urban society. First, whereas 
most social movement literarture predict a positive casual relation between the 
presence of autonomous organization and participation rate, our cases show that 
the relation is very weak in Hong Kong. It can only be made sense by considering 
the strong influence of local rural elite in deterring their fellow villagers to 
participate in protest action. If the elite hold a suppressive stand to the 
mobilization, the autonomous organization is impotent in getting much villagers 
involved. In this situation, the organization can at most attract a few of them who 
are not afraid of their village leaders. 
Second, whereas many social movement literature predict a positive 
relation between repression level and strategy adopted by the collective actors, 
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(higher repression level leads to more confrontational strategy) our cases show 
that such relation is not significant. What the Westem social movement literature 
concerns is the repression from the state, (such as the state policing of the 
community) what is mentioned in our cases is the repression of the rural local 
elite. As the repression level of the British colonial state is not high and remains 
more or less constant, it is not put into our picture. Since the target o f the protests 
concerned in the analysis here is principally the colonial authority and not the 
local elite, the repression of the latter might hardly affect the means the protesters 
adopted to achieve their ends. 
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Conclusion 
First of all, in the first two sections, we find that the New Territories under 
rapid economic growth has never been totally free of conflicts. The generalized 
concept of ‘rural stability' as used by the first generation local sociologists is 
inadequate in describing the situation of rural Hong Kong under colonial rule. In 
my study, the question of "why is rural Hong Kong so stable?" is replaced by 
another set of questions: under what specific conditions would the conflicts in the 
village be contained, and under what conditions would they give rise to protest 
action of different forms? If the conflicts were contained successfully most of the 
time, why? 
From the insights drawn from the literature on collective action and the 
comparative case studies, I locate two crucial factors of the emergence or non-
emergence of rural protests. The first is the absence or presence of suppression by 
the rural elite. The second is the absence or presence of autonomous organization 
in the villages. The total non-occurrence of rural protests was indeed a combined 
effect of the absence of autonomous organizations and presence of elite 
suppression. Highly confrontational collective action with high participation rate 
would appear when the elite suspended their suppression of mobilization and 
relevant autonomous organizations existed. When only one of the two conditions 
of non-emergence of rural protest was fulfilled, intermediate forms of collective 
action would arise: either confrontational action with low participation rate or 
non-confrontational action with high participation rate. 
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Viewed in this light, to explain the ‘rural stability' in Hong Kong is to 
explain why the rural elite were always suppressive to grassroots mobilization and 
why there were little autonomous organizations in the village. These can be 
explained in tum by two socio-political situations of the New Territories. First, 
the colonial authority did institutionalize a stable alliance relationship with the 
rural elite between the 1956 and 1985. Within this period, the rural elite were 
more than willing to forestall any confrontational collective action against the 
state among their fellow villagers, and try resolving any conflict to the 
institutionalized negotiation. Second, most organizations potentially capable of 
developing its mobilizing networks in the villages were not much devoted to the 
countryside. All voluntary associations of Hong Kong focused their efforts on the 
urban area. Providing service to the rural areas was more or less their sideline 
activities. The same urban bias was seen among the left-wing grassroots 
organizations. The size and resources of the rural leftist organizations were much 
smaller than those of the leftist unions in the city. The urban bias of these 
organizations requires futher explanation which is out of the scope ofthis study. 
The most important implication here is that the tranquillity in the rural 
areas was not given by some static factors such as the apathy of the villagers to 
politics or "utilitarian familism", but was a result of contingent factors - that is, 
elite alliance with the authority and lack of autonomous organizations - which 
were historically and contextually specific. Second, though I agree with Kuan and 
Lau (1979) that the mechanism of "incentive dispensation" and the co-optation of 
the rural elite into the administration system were crucial in keeping the village 
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stable, my study points out that to confine our analysis to the interface between 
the state and the strata of rural elite is too narrow. Equally important is what the 
elite actually did after they were brought o f fby the authority to prevent grassroots 
mobilization. "Incentive dispensation" between the local elite and individual 
villagers was just one of the many ways to achieve this. Other methods included 
direct or indirect coercion exercised by the elite such as threatening and rumours. 
Of course, the effective functioning of state co-optation and "incentive 
dispensation" cannot be taken for granted. Our cases show that the effects of these 
mechanisms were not guaranteed everywhere and every time. Again, the effects 
were historically and contextually specific. 
In conclusion, what this study tells us is that the "rural stability" in Hong 
Kong - or we can extend the conclusion to the case ofurban stability as well - is a 
historical phenomenon. Whether such stability will continue into the future is not 
guaranteed. At last, but not least, the reified image of a "stable" New Territories 
in particular and Hong Kong in general has to be abandoned. 
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